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Abstract
Secure and Efficient Delegation of a Single and Multiple




Group exponentiation is an important operation used in many cryptographic proto-
cols, specifically public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie Hellman, ElGamal, etc.
To expand the applicability of group exponentiation to computationally weaker devices,
procedures were established by which to delegate this operation from a computation-
ally weaker client to a computationally stronger server. However, solving this problem
with a single, possibly malicious, server, has remained open since a formal cryptographic
model was introduced [17]. Several later attempts either failed to achieve privacy or only
achieved constant security probability.
In this dissertation, we study and solve this problem for discrete log type groups and
RSA type groups for single and multiple (batch) exponentiations and apply our solution
in several protocols. Each of our protocols satisfies natural correctness, security, privacy,
and efficiency requirements, where security holds with exponentially small probability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Radio frequency identification or RFID is an automatic identification system which con-
sists of two parts: the tags and the reader. A tag contains, in its memory, information
about its identification (ID) and a reader can read the IDs of tags by running a link-layer
protocol wirelessly when placed sufficiently close to the tag. There are two different kinds
of RFID tags: passive and active. Passive tags do not have a battery and therefore their
lifetime is practically unlimited. They are also inexpensive to manufacture (only a few
cents). The reader energizes these tags with RF continuously while reading information
from them. In comparison with active RFID tags, or tags that have an internal energy
source, writing an efficient protocol for passive RFID tags is more challenging. One must
address such issues as limited memory storage, power, and computational resources.
This research is about implementing security and privacy in passive RFID communi-
cation. Secure communication requires encryption of information before it is transmitted.
Only the intended receiver should be able to decrypt the information. An eavesdropper
should not be able to do the same. There are two categories of encryption schemes:
1
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asymmetric key and symmetric key. The public key and asymmetric protocol is the most
challenging to implement (among the two protocols) as it demands more storage space
and power than its counterpart. There is a need to design strong cryptographic schemes
for computationally weaker devices such as RFID tags. This problem is solved in this
thesis given the constraints below:
• a computationally weaker client holds an input and description of the function
• a computationally stronger server holds the same description of the function
Given the above constraints, the solution satisfies:
• correctness : If both the client and the server are honest, the client obtains the
output of the function from the server in response to the input delivered from client
to server.
• security : the server cannot convince the client of a wrong computational output.
• privacy : the server cannot learn any information about the client’s input.
• efficiency : the client’s computation time is significantly shortened by delegating the
process to the server rather than performing the computation without client-server
interaction.
This thesis describes a protocol for interacting with a single, possibly malicious server,
whereby the client delegates single or multiple exponentiations of a multiplicative group
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element to be processed by the aforementioned server. The goal is to have the client make
a small number of group multiplications rather than a non-delegated group exponentia-
tion.
1.1 Construction
First and foremost, the aim is to write down rigorous definitions based on [17, 15] for
the correctness, security, privacy and efficiency requirements for delegated computation
protocols in a single server(possibly malicious) setting. In this model, we construct several
protocols that satisfy these constraints, while delegating group exponentiation to a single
malicious server. Specifically, we describe protocols for group exponentiation, in which
the base of the exponent is a fixed constant and the power of the exponent is a variable
(fixed-base, variable-exponent), and vise versa (variable-base, fixed-exponent). Then we
extend this idea to multiple (batch) exponentiations. First, we write the protocol for group
exponentiation for fixed-base variable-exponent, and then implement a similar protocol
for fixed exponent variable base using the inverse delegation from Appendix A as discussed
in [10]. Most of the protocols satisfy exponentially small security probability, which is
a function of the security parameter (e.g. if security parameter = 128, then security
probability = = 2−128 ). We also introduce protocols for general, as well as specific,
groups such as cyclic groups, RSA-type groups, and prime order-groups.
Before we begin discussing our protocols, we would like to talk about the pseudo-
random power generator, which is used in an offline phase for the protocols described
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in Chapter 3. Alternatively, we could consider a model with an offline phase, where
a client can precompute exponentiations to random exponents using the square-and-
multiply algorithm (discussed in Appendix B), or Yao’s algorithm (discussed in [34]) or
another party can precompute these exponentiations and store them on the client’s device.
Protocols for general groups are introduced in Chapter 3. In Section 3.1, we describe
an efficient protocol with security probability = 1/2 for group exponentiations of the
fixed-exponent variable-base and variable-exponent fixed-base varieties. The main idea
for these protocols comes from [10]. In Section 3.2, we use direct parallel repetition of
the protocol in Section 3.1 and thereby achieve better security probability. Our next
protocol, presented in Section 3.3, is a parameterized class of protocols where, for some
values of the parameters, the security probability is reduced more efficiently than by direct
parallel repetition. Both protocols achieve the following efficiency trade off: they reduce
the number of the client’s group multiplications during the online phase, while increasing
the number of group exponentiations of random exponents during the offline phase as
well as the number of the server’s group exponentiations.
The privacy and security properties attributed to our protocols presuppose the exis-
tence of a pseudo random power generator but have no additional complexity assumptions,
as the adversary corrupting the server is not limited to run in polynomial time. These
protocols are written for the functions: FG,exp,g(x) = g
x (i.e. fixed-base variable-exponent
exponentiation function) and FG,exp,k(x) = x
k (i.e. variable-base fixed-exponent exponen-
tiation function) for general groups. Note that for the function FG,exp,k(x) = x
k, we need
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the delegation of group inverses protocol, written in Appendix A. Overall, the resulting
protocols in this chapter have constant security probability as atomic protocols. Then,
using parallel repetition of these protocols, we can achieve the security probability of the
client equal to 2−λ for statistical security parameter λ. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 describe the
parameters for the protocols of Chapter 3.
Table 1.1: Comparison of parameters in protocols of Chapter 3 and in [10] for the function
FG,exp,k in general group.
[10] 3.2.2 3.3.2, c = 2 3.3.2, c = 9 3.4.2, c = 2 3.4.2, c = 9
Mod. Mult. (on) 5 640 5 5 325 145
Mod. Exp. (off) 2 256 2 9 130 261











Table 1.2: Comparison of parameters in protocols of Chapter 3 and in [10] for the function
FG,exp,g in general group.
3.1.1 3.2.1 3.3.1, c = 2 3.3.1, c = 9 3.4.1, c = 2 3.4.1, c = 9
Mod. Mult.(on) 1 128 1 1 65 29











In Chapter 4, we show delegation of exponentiation in cyclic groups to a single,
possibly malicious, server for the function fixed-base variable-exponent, FG,exp,g . In
Section 4.1 the client only performs a number of group multiplications in linear time i.e.
(= 2λ+3) and the security probability is εs = 2
−λ. If we fix λ = 128 then the client’s online
multiplications = 259 and the security parameter is 1
2128
. The protocol does not have any
complexity assumptions, as the adversary corrupting the server is not limited to run in
polynomial time. In addition, the protocol only requires 2 precomputed exponentiations
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(in the offline phase) and the communication of 4 group elements, thus the schemes are of
much greater interest for practical applications. In Section 4.2, we introduce the protocol
which reduces the client’s online group multiplication to 100, with the same security
parameter as Section 4.1 only with an additional 3 modular exponentiation in the offline
phase. Table 1.3 describes the parameters of the protocols in Chapter 4.
Table 1.3: Comparison of parameters in protocols of Chapter 3 and 4 for the function
FG,exp,g.
4.1 4.2 3.4.1,c = 2 3.4.1, c = 9
Mod. Mult.(on) 259 100 65 29









In Chapter 5, we show delegation of exponentiation in RSA-type groups to a single,
possibly malicious, server for the function FG,exp,k fixed-exponent variable-base. In Section
5.1 the client only performs a number of group multiplications in linear time i.e. (= 4λ+9)
and security probability is εs = 2
−λ. If we fix λ = 128 then the client performs 521 online
multiplications and the security parameter is 1
2128
. The protocol does not require any
complexity assumptions, as the adversary corrupting the server is not limited to run in
polynomial time. In addition, the protocol only requires 2 precomputed exponentiations
in the offline phase and the communication of 4 group elements, thus the schemes are of
much greater interest for practical applications. In Section 5.2, we introduce the protocol
which reduces the client’s online group multiplication to 198, instead of 521, with the
same security parameter only with an additional 3 modular exponentiations in the offline
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phase. Table 1.4 describes the parameters of the protocols in Chapter 5.
Table 1.4: Comparison of parameters in protocols of Chapter 3 and 4 for the function
FG,exp,k.
5.1 5.2 3.4.2,c = 2 3.4.2, c = 9
Mod. Mult.(on) 521 198 325 145
Mod. Exp.(off) 2 5 130 261









In chapter 6, we show batch verification tests and the application of these tests to
the delegation of client - server exponentiations over Discrete Log type groups. Then
we show two client-server protocols for secure batch delegation to a single (and possibly
malicious) server of exponentiations in the q-order subgroup Gq of Z∗p, where p = 2q + 1
and p, q are large primes. These groups are often used in cryptosystems that base their
security on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem or related problems. We show
two batch verification of exponentiation tests in Section 6.2 and then we apply these two
verification tests to two delegation of client server protocols in Section 6.3. Lastly, we
show performance in Section 6.4.
In Chapter 7, we show batch verification tests and the application of these tests to the
delegation of client - server exponentiations over the RSA type groups, more specifically in
the group Z∗N , where N = pq and p, q are large primes of the form p = 2p1+1, q = 2q1+1,
for primes p1, q1. We proceed similarly to the previous chapter for secure batch verification
test and delegation to a single (and possibly malicious) server of exponentiations in Z∗N .
We show two batch verifications of exponentiation tests in Section 7.2 and then we apply
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
these two verification tests to two delegation of client server protocols in Section 7.3 then
we show performance in Section 7.4.
1.2 Related Work
Secure outsourcing or delegating exponentiation has continuously been a popular topic.
Many papers proposed new ideas, but then the ideas were broken in follow-up papers.
Papers [15] and [23] write good solutions for the delegation of any polynomial circuit
to a single (semi – honest in [23]) server using garbled circuits and fully-homomorphic
encryption. The solutions given in those papers are asymptotically efficient, but are not
efficient for low power devices such as passive RFID tags.
Papers [10, 17, 12, 13, 22, 9, 18] write solutions for both the client and server using
the pseudo-random-powers generation assumption, which we also employ in Chapter 3.
In addition, the hidden-subset-sum assumption is used in [22, 21] and [20] under the
(stronger) subset sum hardness assumption.
In [10, 17], modular exponentiation is motivated by the utility in RFID tags. Specifi-
cally, in [17], the authors presented two kinds of protocols where (1) the client delegates
to two non-colluding cloud servers, of which at most one is untrusted, and (2) the client
delegates to one cloud server which is trusted (on average). In this protocol the client has
to perform O(log2 l) multiplications, where |G| = l, and the security probability is 1/2,
where the group has prime order. The follow up paper, [12], has similar features to [17]
but improves the efficiency of the client and the security probability decreases to 1/3, the
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authors stated that ”an interesting open problem is whether there is an efficient algorithm
for secure outsourcing modular exponentiation using only one untrusted cloud server”,
which is addressed in this thesis. The next follow up paper, [9], with the same definition
as in paper [17] tries to improve the security probability to 1/λ2 where λ is the bit length
of the exponent for the variable-base, variable-exponent exponentiation function, but we
found a contradiction in both described protocols (i.e. the defined privacy requirement
does not hold because given a1 and a2, the server can learn information about the private
input a). In Table 1.5 we make a comparison between our scheme in Chapter 4 and the
schemes in [22, 12, 10].
Table 1.5: Comparing of outsourcing single exponentiation
[22] [12] [10] Chapter 4
Function ver-base ver-exp fix-base ver-exp ver-base fix-exp fix-base ver-exp
RandG,exp,g 7 5 2 2
Mod. Mult. 12 7 5 2
Mod. Exp. 1(λ - bit) 0 0 1 (λ - bit)
Mod. Inv. 4 3 0 0
Queries to S 4 6 3 2
Privacy









# of S Single server Two servers Single server Single server





3 ) over the square and multiply algorithm by assuming a prime order group
platform. In addition, the base and exponent are known to the server and the adversary,
thus the privacy requirement is not applicable in this paper. The authors in paper [22]
present a protocol to delegate variable-exponent, variable- base exponentiations to a single
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untrusted server. In [10], the authors write protocols for delegation of group inverse and
delegation of group exponentiation for fixed-exponent, variable-base exponentiations with
constant security probability. In this proposal, we improve the security probability of [22]
and extend the work to variable-exponent, fixed base exponentiations.
Batch cryptography was first discussed in [27]. The problems in batch cryptography
are primarily concerned with performing multiple cryptographic protocol executions at
lower costs than independent executions. The results in the literature can be characterized
as focusing on verifying multiple outputs of an atomic function (the most studied being
group exponentiation, since it is a cornerstone of many cryptographic protocols), as well
as on application domains like operations (e.g. generation, verification) within encryption
or signature schemes. A first set of formal treatments and solutions emerged from the
works in [28, 29, 6, 26, 30]. In particular, batch verification algorithms have been provided
for exponentiation over prime-order groups and digital signatures [6, 26, 30]. The state-of-
the-art batch verifier for group exponentiation, named the Random Subset and the Small
Exponents tests in [6], has been studied in [28, 29, 6, 26]. We show novel extensions of
the Random Subset and the Small Exponents test to efficiently, privately and securely
verify exponentiations over Discrete Log and RSA groups by a malicious server.
Chapter 2
Definitions
In this chapter we write the basic definitions of correctness, security, privacy and efficiency
requirements for a delegation protocol (such as in [17] and [15]).
2.1 Basic notations
Let us define the
• y ← T : the probabilistic process of randomly and independently choosing y from
the set T .
• y ← A(x1, x2, . . . ) : y is the output of a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm A on
inputs x1, x2, . . . and any necessary random coins.
• (zA, zB, tr)← (A(x1, x2, . . . ), B(y1, y2, . . . )) : zA is the output from (possibly proba-
bilistic) algorithm A on inputs x1, x2, . . . and any necessary random coins. Similarly,
zB is the output of algorithm B, and tr is the sequence of messages exchanged by
A and B.
11
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2.2 System Scenario, Entities, and Protocol
Consider the system of parties, client and server, where the client’s computational re-
sources is more limited than the server, thus the client needs to delegate (outsource) the
computation of a specific function to the servers. Let C be a single client and S be a
single server in all of the outlined protocols.
Let σ denote the computational security parameter (i.e., the parameter derived from
hardness considerations on the underlying computational problem), and let λ denote
the statistical security parameter (i.e., a parameter such that events with probability
2−λ). Both parameters are expressed in unary notation (i.e., 1σ, 1λ). For concreteness
we use σ = 2048 and λ = 128, the currently recommended parameter settings in many
cryptographic protocols and their applications.
Let F : Dom(F ) → CoDom(F ) be a function where Dom(F ) is the domain of F ,
CoDom is the range of F and desc(F ) denotes the description of F . Let
(C(1σ, 1λ, desc(F ), x1, . . . , xn), S(1
σ, 1λ, desc(F ))) be the client-server protocol for the del-
egated (n-instance) computation of F , a two party communication protocol between C
and S, where desc(f) is known to both C and S, and the input x is known only to C.
A delegated computation of the value yi = F (xi) for i = 1, . . . , n is the execution, using
independently chosen random bits for C and S, of the above client-server protocol and
denoted as:
1. pp← C(1σ, 1λ, desc(F )),
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2. ((y1, . . . , yn), tr)← (C(1σ, 1λ, desc(F ), x1, . . . , xn), S(1σ, 1λ, desc(F ))
Case 1 is executed in an offline phase, when the inputs x1, . . . , xn to the function F
are not yet available. If needed by the application, case 1 could be executed by a third
party that does not collude with S. Case 2 is executed in the online phase, when the
inputs x1, . . . , xn to the function F are available to C. At the end of both phases, C learns
zi (intended to be yi = F (xi)), and tr is the transcript of the communication between
C and S. The delegated computation between client and server can be sequential (i.e.
each execution begins after the previous one is finished) or concurrent (i.e. the server
computes several executions at the same time from different clients). In this thesis we
only consider sequential computation.
2.3 Correctness Requirements
Intuitively, the correctness requirement states that if the client and the server follow the
protocol then at the end of the protocol the client receives some output which is equal to
the n-tuple of values obtained by evaluating F on the client’s m inputs.
First, consider the correctness Algorithm 1 below, denoted as CorrExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ):
Definition. Let σ, λ be the security parameters, F be a function, and (C, S) be a client-
server protocol for the delegated computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies δc-
correctness if, for any xi for i = 1, . . . , n in F ’s domain,
Pr
[
out← CorrExpF,A(1σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≥ δc
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Algorithm 1 Correctness Algorithm: CorrExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ)
1: pp← C(desc(F ))
2: (z1, . . . , zm)← (C(pp, x1, . . . , xn), S)





for some δc close to 1.
2.4 Security Requirements
Intuitively, the basic security requirement states that if C follows the protocol, at the
end of the protocol, a malicious adversary S cannot convince C to obtain output zi such
that zi 6= yi where yi = F (xi) and xi is the input chosen by C for some i = 1, . . . , n. For
stronger and more realistic security we can extend the power of the adversary by letting
him choose C’s inputs (x1, . . . , xn) and execute the protocol polynomially many times,
before trying to convince C to accept an incorrect output.
First, consider the security Algorithm 2 below, denoted as SecExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ):
Algorithm 2 Security Algorithm: SecExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ)
1: pp← C(desc(F ))
2: (x1, . . . , xn, aux)← A(desc(F ))
3: (z1, . . . , zn)← (C(pp, x1, . . . , xn), A(aux))
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Definition. Let σ, λ be the security parameters, F be a function, and (C, S) be a
client-server protocol for the delegated computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies
εs−security against a malicious adversary if, for any algorithm A,
Pr
[
out← SecExpF,A(1σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ εs
for some small εs.
2.5 Privacy Requirements
Intuitively, the basic privacy requirement states that if C follows the protocol, a malicious
adversary corrupting S cannot get any information regarding C’s input x from a protocol
execution. In the cryptography literature privacy requirements have indistinguishable
based approach, meaning the adversary can pick two inputs x0, x1 and one of these inputs
is chosen randomly by C to be used in the protocol. Then, the adversary tries to guess
which input C used in the protocol. For a stronger and more realistic privacy requirement
we should extend the power of the adversary by letting him choose the input to C and then
executing the protocol polynomially many times before attempting to guess C’s input.
We also consider a weaker privacy requirement, based on high residual entropy, where
the protocol’s transcript may leak some information about random inputs x1, . . . , xn, but
still leaves them undetermined among a very large set.
First, consider the privacy Algorithm 3 denote it as PrivExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ):
Definition. Let σ, λ be the security parameters, F be a function, and (C, S) be a client-
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Algorithm 3 Privacy Algorithm: PrivExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ)
1: pp← C(desc(F ))
2: ((x0,1 . . . , x0,n), (x1,1, . . . , x1,n), aux)← A(desc(F ))
3: b← {0, 1}
4: ((z1, . . . , zn), tr)← (C(pp, (xb,1 . . . , xb,n), A(aux))
5: d← A(aux)





server protocol for the delegated computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies εp-
privacy (in the sense of indistinguishability) against a malicious adversary if
for any algorithm A,
Pr
[
out← PrivExpF,A(1σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ εp
for some small εp close to 0.
2.6 Efficiency Metrics and Requirements
Let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of function F . We
say that (C, S) has efficiency parameters (tF , tP , tC , tS, cc,mc), where F can be computed
using tF (σ, λ) atomic operations, C can run in the offline phase using tP (σ, λ) atomic
operations and in the online phase using tC(σ, λ) atomic operations, S can be run tS(σ, λ)
atomic operations, C and S exchange a total of at most mc messages, the length of those
messages is cc. The atomic operation is considered as a group operation such as group
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multiplication, inverse calculation, and/or exponentiation and are not considered atomic
operations (e.g equality testing between two elements). In our analysis we only consider
the most expensive group operations as atomic operations (e.g., group multiplications
and/or exponentiation), and neglect lower-order operations (e.g., equality testing, addi-
tions and subtractions between group elements). The main goal is to have the protocols
satisfy that tC(σ, λ) is smaller than tF (σ, λ) and tS(σ, λ) is not significantly larger than
tF (σ, λ), with the following underlying assumptions:
1. group inverses require significantly more resources than group multiplication;
2. group exponentiation requires significantly more resources than group multiplica-
tion.
In addition, we want to minimize other protocol efficiency metrics, such as message com-
plexity mc and communication complexity cc. We notice that according to the textbook




In this chapter we present protocols for delegation of exponentiation in general groups
for the functions FG,exp,g : Zq → G, denoted as FG,exp,x(x) = gx, and FG,exp,k : G → G,
denoted as FG,exp,k(x) = x
k. In Section 3.1 we describe the basic protocol, which satisfies
that the security parameter εs is equal to 1/2 for both functions. In Section 3.2, we use
the idea of parallel repetition of the protocol in Section 3.1 λ times, in order to improve
the security probability to 2−λ. In the next protocol in Section 3.3, we introduce a class
of protocols which depends on parameters c and m, where the security parameter εs
reduces from 1/2 to roughly 1/c without using parallel repetition. In Section 3.4 we use
the protocol in Section 3.3, along with the method of parallel repetition, to get security
probability εs = 2
−λ. In these protocols we have the following conditions:
• the security probability, εs, decreases
• the client’s group multiplication during the online phase decreases
• the client’s group exponentiation during the offline phase increases
18
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• the server’s group exponentiation increases
The protocols’ privacy and security properties use a pseudo random power generator
assumption and no additional complexity assumptions. The server can be any malicious
and server is not limited to run the protocol in polynomially many times.
3.1 Basic Delegating Exponentiation
This section describes the most efficient protocol with constant security probability for
evaluating group exponentiations, specifically fixed-base variable exponent and fixed-
exponent variable-base exponentiations. In further sections we write protocols to improve
upon the security probability in this section.
3.1.1 Basic Delegating Exponentiation for Fixed-Base Variable-
Exponent Group
In this section we write an efficient protocol for the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G, denoted
as FG,exp,x(x) = g
x, with constant security probability, specifically εs = 1/2. First, we
write the notation, theorem and a description of the protocol which satisfies the theorem
for the function FG,exp,g. Then, we prove the theorem by showing correctness, efficiency,
privacy, and security requirements.
Notations: Let l =: dlog |G|e, the length of the binary representation of the element
of group. We say group is efficient if its description is short, i.e. has length polynomial in
l, its associated operation ∗ and inverse operation are efficient, i.e. they can be executed
in time polynomial in l. Let σ be the security parameter and l be the group element
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length where σ and l are typically the same value. Assume (G, ∗) is an efficient group,
and let g ∈ G be an element with order > 2q for some large integer q which is known
to the client. Let y = gx denote the exponentiation of g to the x-th power; i.e. the
value y ∈ G such that g ∗ · · · ∗ g = y, where the multiplication operation ∗ is applied
x − 1 times. Let the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G be denoted as FG,exp,x(x) = gx where
x ∈ Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, g ∈ G and |g| > 2q.
We say that RandG,g is a pseudo-random power generator if it is a satisfiable, proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm with the following syntax and properties:
1. on input i = 0, RandG,g returns an auxiliary state information aux;
2. on input i > 0 auxiliary state information aux, RandG,g returns a pair (ui, g
ui),
where ui ∈ G and update the state aux;
3. for any polynomial p, the tuple {(u1, gu1), . . . , (up(σ), gup(σ))}, obtained as part of
the output of algorithm RandG,g, is computationally indistinguishable from the
tuple {(z1, gz1), . . . , (zp(σ), gzp(σ))}, where z1, . . . , zp(σ) are random and independent
elements from G.
A generator with these properties was first designed in [7], then refined in [21], and since
has been used in a number of works, including previous work in outsourcing modular
exponentiation [10]. This generator can be designed based on the hidden-subset-sum
assumption in groups. The running time of RandG,k is comparable to about mr group
multiplications where mr = O(log
2 l).
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Theorem 3.1.1. Let σ be the security parameter, and let G be an efficient group. There
exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of the func-
tion FG,exp,g which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, for εs = 1/2
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = 2 group exponentiations in G
• tP is = 2 group exponentiations with random exponents in G using pseudo
random power generator (≈ 2 log2(l) group multiplications).
• tC is = 1 group multiplications in G
• cc = 2 elements in G and 2 elements in Zq
• mc = 2.
We remark that Theorem 3.1.1 satisfies the constant security parameter requirement,
i.e. εs = 1/2. The protocol requirement only 1 group multiplication, in comparison to, the
average number of group multiplications in the square-and-multiply algorithm discussed
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in Appendix B (which performs 1.5σ multiplications, more specifically when σ = 2048,
1.5σ = 3072 >> 1). Next we will show a protocol which satisfies Theorem 3.1.1.
Informal description of the protocol (C, S). In our protocol we have both an offline
phase and an online phase. In the offline phase, C generates, using pseudo random power
generator, two pairs (u0, v0), (u1, v1), where u0, u1 are random elements in Zq and vi = gui
mod q for i = 0, 1. In the online phase, one of these two pairs is used to verify that one of
the two pairs sent by S is correct, and the other is used to mask C’s input x and calculate
y = gx with the help of S. Since S does not know which pair will be used by C for either
of these two purposes, the security of this protocol is at most 1/2, meaning that C can
compute an incorrect output for the function FG,exp,g with probability at most 1/2.
Formal description of the protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,g)
Input to C: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G and x ∈ Zq, aux = RandG,g(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (ui, vi, aux) = RandG,g(i, aux), for i = 0, 1;
Online phase instructions:
1. C randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1};
C sets zb := ub, z1−b := x− u1−b mod q;
C sends z0, z1 to S;
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2. S computes wi := g
zi for i = 0, 1;
S sends w0, w1 to C
3. if wb 6= vb
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes y := w1−b ∗ v1−b and returns y
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(ui, vi, aux) = RandG,g(i, aux) for i = 0, 1
Online Phase:
b ∈R {0, 1}
zb := ub, z1−b := x− u1−b mod q
z0,z1−−→
w0,w1←−−− wi = gzi for i = 0, 1
C checks if wb
?
= vb then
If no, C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
Else C returns y = w1−b ∗ v1−b
Proof of Theorem 3.1.1:
Properties of protocol (C, S):
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1. The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection.
• With respect to round complexity: only one round complexity
– One message from C to S followed by one message from S to C (i.e.
mc = 2.)
• With respect to communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer
of 2 elements in Zq and 2 elements in G (i.e. z0, z1 ∈ Zq and w0, w1 ∈ G). Thus
cc = 4.
• With respect to running time complexity:
– S runs 2 exponentiation operations.
– C runs 2 offline group exponentiation, tP = 2 using pseudo random gen-
erator and 1 online phase multiplication operation in G, i.e. tC = 1.
2. The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow
the protocol, C’s equality verification in step 3 will be satisfied, and thus C’s output
y is 6=⊥ and satisfies:




which is y = FG,exp,g(x) for each x ∈ Zq.
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3. The privacy property is obeyed by observing that the messages z0, z1 sent by C
do not leak any information about x ∈ Zq. Notice that (u0, u1) is computation-
ally indistinguishable from a pair of random elements in Zq, which complies with
property 3 of the pseudo-random (G, g)-power generator. The pair (z0, z1) is also
computationally indistinguishable because zb = ub and z1−b = x − u1−b mod q for
b ∈R {0, 1}. Therefore, messages z0, z1 sent by C do not leak any information about
x.
4. To show that the security property is satisfied, we consider three cases for w0, w1
sent to the client from the server:
(a) If both inequalities w0 6= gz0 and w1 6= gz1 hold.
(b) If one of the two inequalities w0 6= gz0 and w1 6= gz1 hold.
(c) If both equalities w0 = g
z0 and w1 = g
z1 holds.
In case a) C returns ⊥ because in step 3 of the protocol, C checks if wb 6= vb then
the protocol halts. Therefore, the adversary is successful in convincing C to return
an output 6= FG,exp,g(x) with probability 0.
In case b) either C returns ⊥ in step 3, or C computes y 6= FG,exp,g(x). The goal
of the adversary is to pass the check in step 3 and C computes y 6= FG,exp,g(x), and
this occurs if the adversary correctly guesses b. This happens with probability 1/2.
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In case c) the server is honest. Therefore, the adversary is successful in convincing
C to return an output 6= FG,exp,g(x) with probability 0.
Hence, the adversary is successful in convincing C to return an output 6= FG,exp,g(x)
with probability at most 1/2.
3.1.2 Basic Delegating Exponentiation for Fixed Exponent
Variable Base Group
In this section we describe a similar protocol as in the previous subsection, for the function
FG,exp,k : G → G denoted as FG,exp,k(x) = xk, introduced in [10]. First we write the
notation, theorem, and description of the protocol satisfying the theorem for the function
FG,exp,k. Then, we prove the theorem by showing correctness, efficiency, privacy, and
security requirements.
Notations: Let (G, ∗) be a commutative group, let l = dlog |G|e and let k > 0 be an
integer (assumed for simplicity k < |G|).
Let σ be a security parameter. Similarly as before, RandG,k is a pseudo-random power
generator if it satisfies probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm with the following syntax
and properties:
1. on input i = 0, RandG,k returns an auxiliary state information aux;
2. on input i > 0 auxiliary state information aux, RandG,k returns a pair (ui, u
k
i ),
where ui ∈ G and updates the state aux;
3. for any polynomial p, the tuple {(u1, uk1), . . . , (up(σ), ukp(σ))}, obtained as part of the
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output of algorithm RandG,k, is computationally indistinguishable from the tuple
{(z1, zk1 ), . . . , (zp(σ), zkp(σ))}, where z1, . . . , zp(σ) are random and independent elements
from G.
Now we write the formal theorem:
Theorem 3.1.2. Let σ be a security parameter, let k be a positive integer and assume
the existence of a pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator. There exists (constructively) a
client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of function FG,exp,k which satisfies:
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, for εs = 1/2
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G;
• tS is = 2 group exponentiations and = 1 group inverse in G;
• tP is = 2 group exponentiations using pseudo random power generator in G;
• tC is = 5 group multiplications in G;
• cc = 6 elements in G and mc = 2.
We remark that Theorem 3.1.2 satisfies that the security requirement is constant for
the function FG,exp,k, i.e. εs = 1/2 and C calculates only 5 group multiplications in
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comparison to the average number of group multiplications in the square-and-multiply
algorithm, discussed in Appendix B (which performs 1.5σ multiplications, more specifi-
cally when σ = 2048, 1.5σ = 3072 >> 5). Next we will show the protocol which satisfies
Theorem 3.1.2.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). In this protocol, C uses the procedure
RandG,k to generate two pairs (u0, v0), (u1, v1) of random group elements u0, u1, and their
k-th powers v0, v1, respectively. Then, one of these two pairs is used to verify that the
answers from S are correct and the other pair is used to mask C’s input x and allow C
to compute a k-th power of x, using the answers received from S. Division is delegated
to S by using one group multiplication and the inverse delegation from the protocol in
Appendix A. The privacy property follows from the fact that the message sent by C to S
is computationally indistinguishable from random elements in G with their k-th powers,
in turn based on the properties of RandG,k, and thus leaks no information about x. The
security property follows from the fact that the message sent by C to S does not reveal
which of the two pairs of group elements is used for verification and which is used for
computation. Therefore, any dishonest answer from S will be determined by C with
probability at least 1/2.
Formal description of protocol (C, S). We will use Theorem 10 from Appendix A
on (Cinv, Sinv) for delegated computation of inverses in group G. For instance, on input
value x in G to be inverted, Cinv returns a group value d to send to Sinv; then on input
d, Sinv returns a group value e to be sent to Cinv; finally based on x, d, e the algorithm
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Cinv computes the value x
−1.
Also, let RandG,k denote a pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator. We assume that
C computes aux = RandG,k(0) once at set up time, before running any delegated com-
putation protocol.
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k)
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k), x ∈ G, aux = RandG,k(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (ui, vi, aux) = RandG,g(i, aux), for i = 0, 1;
Online phase instructions:
1. C randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1};
C sets zb = ub, z1−b = x ∗ u1−b;
C runs Cinv on input v1−b, to obtain d;
C sends z0, z1, d to S;
2. S computes wi = z
k
i for i = 0, 1;
S runs Sinv on input d, thus obtains e;
S sends w0, w1, e to C
3. C runs Cinv on input v1−b, d, e to compute v
−1
1−b;
if this execution of (Cinv, Sinv) returns ⊥ as output
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C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
if wb 6= vb (wb = zkb = ukb = vkb )
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes y = w1−b ∗ v−11−b and returns y
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(ui, vi, aux) = RandG,k(i, aux) for i = 0, 1
Online Phase:
b ∈R {0, 1}
zb := ub, z1−b := x ∗ u1−b




i for i = 0, 1
w0,w1,e←−−−− Sinv(d) = e (d−1 = e)
Cinv(v1−b, d, e) = v
−1
1−b
( c ∗ e = c ∗ d−1 = c ∗ (v1−b ∗ c)−1 = v−11−b)
if (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
if wb 6= vb then
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL GROUP EXPONENTIATION 31
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes y = w1−b ∗ v−11−band returns y
Proof of Theorem 3.1.2:
Properties of protocol (C, S):
1. The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection.
• With respect to round complexity: only one round complexity
– One message from C to S followed by one message from S to C (i.e.
mc = 2.)
• With respect to communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer
of 6 elements (i.e. cc = 6)
• With respect to running time complexity:
– S runs 2 exponentiation operations and 1 inversion operation.
– C runs 2 multiplication operations in G, and 1 execution of the inverse
delegation protocol (requires 3 multiplications)
– tP = 2, because in the offline phase C executes the procedure RandG,k.
2. The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow
the protocol, C’s equality verification in step 3 will be satisfied, and thus C’s output
y is 6=⊥ and satisfies:
y =w1−b ∗ v−11−b
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=(z1−b)
k ∗ ((u1−b)k)−1
=(x ∗ u1−b)k ∗ (u1−b)−k
=xk ∗ (u1−b)k ∗ (u1−b)−k (by commutativity)
=xk
which is y = FG,exp(x) for each x ∈ G.
3. The privacy property follows from the following two observations:
(a) on a single execution of (C, S) the message z0, z1, d sent by C does not leak
any information about x.
(b) seeing multiple executions of (C, S) does not help the adversary to obtain
information about the input x in a new execution, even when C’s input is
chosen by the adversary.
To show the observation (a), first notice that (u0, u1) is computationally indistin-
guishable from a pair of random group elements by the property 3 of pseudo-random
(G, k)-power generator. Thus, the pair (z0, z1) is also computationally indistinguish-
able, because zb = ub and z1−b = x ∗ u1−b for b ∈R {0, 1}. In addition, the value d
does not depend on x. Therefore, the message z0, z1, d sent by C does not leak any
information about x. This follows from Theorem 3.1.1.
To show observation (b), notice that the protocol (C, S) is one round complexity
and if the protocol executed multiple times, it does not change the result.
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4. The security property follows by combining the following two observations:
(a) in each execution of (C, S), if S follows the protocol, then the equality y =
FG,exp,k(x) holds for each x ∈ G;
(b) seeing multiple executions of (C, S) does not help the adversary violate the
equality y = FG,exp,k(x) in a future execution, even when C’s input in these
executions are chosen by adversary.
To show the observation (a), first consider a single execution of (C, S), where C
follows the protocol, and, for any probabilistic polynomial adversary corrupting S,
consider the values w0, w1, e returned by the adversary to C.
• The value e is associated with an execution of the inverse delegation protocol
from Appendix A, which calculates the inverse of d and is secure by Theorem
A.0.1. If the adversary deviates from the protocol in computing an e, C will
detect the division and return the failure symbol ⊥.
• The value w0, w1, where wi = zki for i ∈ {0, 1}. Since vb = ukb , assuming
property 3 of the pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator, S cannot guess the
random bit b, and the verification wb = vb will be passed with probability at
most 1/2. If wb 6= vb then C returns the failure symbol.
If wb = vb then C returns y = w1−b ∗ v−11−b which is equal to xk for each x by
the correctness property.
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To show observation (b), that multiple executions of (C, S) does not help the ad-
versary to increase the probability of verification wb = vb in the next execution by
assuming property 3 of the pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator.
3.2 Delegating Exponentiation Using Parallel Repe-
tition
In the last section we introduced a protocol which satisfies the security probability εs =
1/2. In this section we improve the security probability εs using the idea of parallel
repetition of the same protocol as seen in the previous section for both functions FG,exp,g
and FG,exp,k.
3.2.1 Delegating Exponentiation Using Parallel Repetition for
Fixed-Base Variable-Exponent Group
In this sub-section, we want to decrease εs = 1/2 to εs = 1/2
λ for a fixed security
parameter λ for the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G, denoted as FG,exp,g(x) = gx. Now we
extend the protocol (C, S) using the parallel repetition method. We will write the theorem
and the satisfying protocol. Then we prove the theorem by showing correctness, efficiency,
privacy, and security requirements.
Theorem 3.2.1. Let σ, λ be security parameters, and let G be an efficient group. There
exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of the func-
tion FG,exp,g which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL GROUP EXPONENTIATION 35
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = 2λ group exponentiations in G
• tP is = 2λ group exponentiations with random exponents in Zq using pseudo
random power generatorλ subtractions in Zq
• tC is = λ group multiplications in G.
• cc = 2λ elements in G and 2λ elements in Zq
• mc = 2.
We remark that Theorem 3.2.1 satisfies a much better security probability, εs = 2
−λ,
than the previous section where the security probability is εs = 2
−1. However, to get a
low security probability the client needs to calculate more group multiplications, more
specifically if λ gets very large the efficiency decreases because C has to calculate λ times
more, than in Theorem 3.1.1. However, this is still better than using the square-and-
multiply algorithm what discussed in Appendix B. More specifically, if λ = 128, σ = 2048,
then C performs 256 group multiplications in Theorem 3.2.1, compared to 1.5σ = 3072
multiplications using the square-and-multiply algorithm.
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Informal description of the protocol (C, S). In our protocol we have two phases,
an offline phase and an online phase as in the previous section. In the offline phase,
C generates 2λ pairs (ui,0, vi,0), (ui,1, vi,1) using pseudo random power generator, where
ui,0, ui,1 are random elements in Zq and vi,j = gui mod q for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 0, 1.
In the online phase, λ of these pairs is used to verify that λ of the 2λ pairs sent by S
is correct. The other λ of these pairs is used to mask C’s input x and calculate y = gx
using the help of S. S does not know which pair will be used by C for any of these two
purposes. Thus, security of this protocol is at most 2−λ, meaning that C can compute an
incorrect output for the function FG,exp,g in this protocol with at most probability 2
−λ.
Formal description of the protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G, x ∈ Zq, aux = RandG,g(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,g(ij, aux), for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 0, 1;
Online phase instructions:
1. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
C randomly chooses bi ∈ {0, 1};
C sets zi,bi := ui,bi , zi,1−bi := x− ui,1−bi mod q;
C sends zi,0, zi,1 to S;
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2. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
S computes wi,j := g
zi,j for j = 0, 1;
S sends wi,0, wi,1 to C
3. For each i = 1, . . . , λ,
if wi,bi 6= vi,bi
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,1−bi ∗ vi,1−bi
if y1 = · · · = yλ
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,g(ij, aux) for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 0, 1
Online Phase:
bi ∈R {0, 1}
zi,bi := ui,bi , zi,1−bi := x− ui,1−bi mod q
z0,1,··· ,z0,λ,z1,1,··· ,z1,λ−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 0, 1
w0,1,··· ,w0,λ,w1,1,··· ,w1,λ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− wi,j = gzi,j
if wi,bi 6= vi,bi for some i = 1, . . . , λ then
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C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,1−bi ∗ vi,1−bi for i = 1, . . . , λ
if y1 = · · · = yλ then
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1:
Properties of protocol (C, S):
1. The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection.
• With respect to round complexity: only one round complexity
– One message from C to S followed by one message from S to C (i.e.
mc = 2.)
• With respect to communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer
of 2λ elements in Zq and 2λ elements in G (i.e. z0,1, · · · , z0,λ, z1,1, · · · , z1,λ ∈ Zq
and w0,1, · · · , w0,λ, w1,1, · · · , w1,λ ∈ G). Thus cc = 4λ.
• With respect to running time complexity:
– S runs 2λ exponentiation operations.
– C runs 2λ offline phase group exponentiation, tP = 2λ using pseudo ran-
dom generator. C runs λ online phase multiplication operations in G,
tC = λ.
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL GROUP EXPONENTIATION 39
2. The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow
the protocol, C’s equality verification in step 3 will be satisfied, and thus C’s output
is 6=⊥ and satisfies:




which is = FG,exp,g(x) for each x ∈ Zq.
3. The privacy property follows by observing that the messages z0,1, · · · , z0,λ,
z1,1, · · · , z1,λ sent by C do not leak any information about x ∈ Zq. Notice that
u0,1, · · · , u0,λ, u1,1, · · · , u1,λ are computationally indistinguishable from random ele-
ments in Zq, which follows by property 3 of pseudo-random (G, g)-power generator.
Thus, it is true for the values z0,1, · · · , z0,λ, z1,1, · · · , z1,λ, because for all i = 0, . . . , λ,
C sets zi,bi := ui,bi and zi,1−bi := x− ui,1−bi mod q for bi ∈R {0, 1}. Therefore, the
messages z0,1, · · · , z0,λ, z1,1, · · · , z1,λ sent by C do not leak any information about x.
4. To show that the security property is satisfied, we consider three cases for the
messages w0,i, w1,i where i = 1, . . . , λ, which S sent to C:
(a) There exist i ∈ {1, ..., λ} such that both inequalities wi,0 6= gzi,0 and wi,1 6= gzi,1
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hold.
(b) For all i ∈ {1, ..., λ} such that one of the inequalities, either wi,0 6= gzi,0 or
wi,1 6= gzi,1 , holds.
(c) For all i ∈ {1, ..., λ} both equalities wi,0 = gzi,0 and wi,1 = gzi,1 hold.
In case a), C returns ⊥ since in step 3 of the protocol above, C checks if wi,bi 6= vi,bi
then C halts the protocol. Therefore, the adversary is successful to convincing C
to return an output 6= FG,exp,g(x) with probability 0.
In case b), either C returns ⊥ , or C computes y 6= FG,exp,g(x) as in step 3. The
goal of the adversary is to pass the check in step 3, and C computes an incorrect
output, i.e. y 6= FG,exp,g(x). This can happen if the adversary correctly guesses the
values bi ∈ {0, 1} , for all i = 1, . . . , λ. This happens with probability 2−λ.
In case c), the server is honest. Therefore, the adversary is successful in convincing
C to return an output 6= FG,exp,g(x) with probability 0.
Hence, the adversary is successful in convincing C to return an output 6= FG,exp,g(x)
with probability at most 2−λ.
3.2.2 Delegating Exponentiation Using Parallel Repetition for
Fixed Exponent Variable Base Group
Similar to the previous subsection, we want to decrease the security probability εs = 1/2
to εs = 1/2
λ, for a fixed security parameter λ for the function FG,exp,k : G→ G denoted as
FG,exp,k(x) = x
k . Thus, we extend the protocol (C, S) using the parallel repetition method
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in Section 3.1.2. We write the theorem and satisfying protocol then prove correctness,
efficiency, privacy, and security requirements.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let σ, λ be security parameters and let k be a positive integer. Assume
the existence of a pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator. There exists (constructively)
a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of the function FG,exp,k which
satisfies:
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = 2λ group exponentiations in G
• tP is = 2λ group exponentiations with random exponents in G using pseudo
random power generator subtractions in Zq
• tC is = 5λ group multiplications in G
• cc = 6λ elements in G and mc = 2.
We remark that this Theorem 3.2.2 satisfies a significanlly better security probability,
i.e. εs = 2
−λ, than Theorem 3.1.2, where εs = 2
−1. However, it requires more calculation
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by C, specifically if λ gets very large, the efficiency decreases because C has to calculate
5λ multiplications rather than 5. But, this is still better than using the square-and-
multiply algorithm which discussed in Appendix B. More specifically, in Theorem 3.2.2 if
λ = 128, σ = 2048, then C performs 640 group multiplications, compared to 1.5σ = 3072
multiplications using the square-and-multiply algorithm.
Informal description of the protocol (C, S). In our protocol we have two phases, an
offline phase and an online phase as in the previous section. In the offline phase, C gener-
ates 2λ pairs (ui,0, vi,0)usingpseudorandompowergenerator, (ui,1, vi,1), where ui,0, ui,1 are
random elements in G and vi,j = u
k
i,j for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 0, 1. In the online phase,
λ of these pairs is used to verify that λ of the 2λ pairs sent by S are correct. From the
other, one pair is used to mask C’s input x and calculate y = xk using the help of S. S
does not know which pair will be used by C for any of these two purposes. Thus, the
security of this protocol is at most 2−λ, meaning that C can compute an incorrect output
for the function FG,exp,k in this protocol with probability at most 2
−λ.
Formal description of the protocol (C, S). We will use the Theorem in Appendix A
on (Cinv, Sinv) for delegated computation of inverse in group G.
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k)
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k), x ∈ G, aux = RandG,k(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
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1. C computes (ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,k(ij, aux), for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 0, 1;
Online phase instructions:
1. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
C randomly chooses bi ∈ {0, 1};
C sets zi,bi := ui,bi , zi,1−bi := x ∗ ui,1−bi ;
C runs Cinv on input vi,1−b, thus obtaining di;
C sends zi,0, zi,1, di to S;
2. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
S computes wi,j := z
k
i,j for j = 0, 1;
S runs Sinv on input di, thus obtains ei;
S sends wi,0, wi,1, ei to C
3. For each i = 1, . . . , λ,
C runs Cinv on input vi,1−bi , di, ei to compute v
−1
i,1−bi ;
if this execution of (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output for some i = 1, . . . , λ
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
if wi,bi 6= vi,bi
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,1−bi ∗ v−1i,1−bi
if y1 = · · · = yλ
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C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,k(ij, aux) for i = 1, . . . , λ, j = 0, 1
Online Phase:
bi ∈R {0, 1}
zi,bi := ui,bi , zi,1−bi := x ∗ ui,1−bi
Cinv(vi,1−bi) = di




w0,i,w1,i,ei←−−−−−− Sinv(di) = ei
Cinv(vi,1−bi , di, ei) = v
−1
i,1−bi
if (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output for some i = 1, . . . , λ
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
if wi,bi 6= vi,bi for some i = 1, . . . , λ then
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,1−bi ∗ v−1i,1−bi for i = 1, . . . , λ
if y1 = · · · = yλ then
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL GROUP EXPONENTIATION 45
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Proof of Theorem 3.2.2: Proof of this Theorem follows similarly as proof of Theorem
3.1.2 and Theorem 3.2.1.
3.3 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Secu-
rity Error Reduction on Atomic Execution
In this section, we improve efficiency and security parameters which we showed in Section
3.1 and 3.2 by studying computation-efficient of reduction of the security parameter εs
and efficiency parameter tP and tC for both functions FG,exp,g and FG,exp,k. First, we
introduce an atomic protocol with improved constant security parameter εs. Then, we
show our atomic protocol which consists of a class of protocols depending two additional
parameters.
3.3.1 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Security Error
Reduction on Atomic Execution for Fixed-Base Variable-
Exponent Group
In this sub-section we work on the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G denoted as FG,exp,g(x) = gx.
We write the theorem and satisfying protocol. Then we prove the theorem by showing
correctness, efficiency, privacy, and security requirements.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let σ, λ be security parameters and c,m be protocol parameters. There
exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of function
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FG,exp,g which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, where εs is constant that depends on parameter c
(see Table 3.1 for exact values, ranging between 0.10763, for c = 2,m = 100, to
0.04080 for c = 9,m = 100)
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameter (tP , tF , tS, tP , , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = m group exponentiations in G
• tP is = c group exponentiations with random exponent in Zq using pseudo
random power generator
• tC is = 1 group multiplication in G
• cc = m elements in G and = m elements in Zq
• mc = 2
We remark that Theorem 3.3.1 satisfies much better security probability in the atomic
protocol when C only performs 1 group multiplication in G during the online phase of the
protocol, than the atomic protocol in Theorem 3.1.1, where the security probability is εs =
2−1. However, the other metrics increase, specifically the number of group exponentiations
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by S (i.e. tS) and the number of pre-computed group exponentiations with random
exponents using pseudo random power generator increase.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). Comparing Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we notice
that in Section 3.1 has security parameter εs =
1
2
and in Section 3.2 with the idea of
parallel repetition, we run of the protocol in Section 3.1 λ times then check that all
repetitions of the protocol returns the same output. If the values are equal, we know
the protocol in Section 3.2 gives the security parameter εs =
1
2λ
. In this section we want
to study a more computationally-efficient protocol for the client in order to reduce the
security probability εs.
Before describing the protocol, we would like to write the inspiration for this protocol.
First, we begin with the same protocol as in Section 3.1, the only changes are, that we
include two random ’decoy’ values, elements of Zq, in C’s message in the online phase.
Then, we shuffle these two ’decoy’ elements and the two other elements described in
Section 3.1, and send those four elements to S. Then the protocol follows similarly as in
Section 3.1. In this way we obtain the following properties:
1. It does not increase C’s number of multiplications (i.e. tC)
2. It slightly increases S’s number of computation (i.e. tS)
3. The security parameter εs decreases from 1/2 to 1/3
In this case εs decreases from 1/2 to 1/3 without increasing C’s number multiplications.
Now, we want to generalize this idea of using m random decoy values in Zq. We will
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show that the generalization of this idea to using m random decoy elements decreases the
security parameter from 1/2 to at most 1/7, which may not be very satisfactory. In order
to decrease the security parameter εs, we should increase the number of equality checks
(in Section 3.1 we have only 1 equality check). In the following protocol we introduce the
parameter c which represents an upper bound on the number of equality checks that C
should execute. More specifically, in the resulting protocol, we have the following steps:
1. c number of pre-computing exponentiations that C calculates in the offline phase
where
• one value is used to compute the function output
• c− 1 values are used to perform equality checks
2. m values in Zq sent by C to S where
• m− c values are decoy elements in Zq
• c random values in Zq, generated in the offline phase using the pseudo random
power generator, one of which is used to mask the input of C.
3. The resulting protocol achieves security parameter εs ≈ 1c
This protocol, which we describe below, is the class of protocols with varying parameters
c and m. We analyze the security parameter, εs, for each of the values c ∈ {2, . . . , 9}
and m.
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Formal description of protocol (C, S). We describe the client-server (C, S) protocol
for the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G denoted as FG,exp,g(x) = gx, where g ∈ G.
Input to S: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G, parameters 1c, 1m
Input to C: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G and x ∈ Zq, aux = RandG,g(0) parameters 1c, 1m
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (uj, vj, aux) = RandG,g(j, aux), for j = 1, . . . , c;
Online phase instructions:
1. C randomly chooses distinct j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
C sets zj1 := u1, . . . , zjc−1 := uc−1, zjc := x− uc mod q;
C randomly and independently chooses zjc+1 , . . . , zjm ∈ Zq when c < m;
C sends z1, . . . , zm to S;
2. S computes wj := g
zj for j = 1, . . . ,m;
S sends w1, . . . , wm to C
3. if wj1 6= vj1 or wj2 6= vj2 or . . . or wjc−1 6= vjc−1
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes y := wjc ∗ vjc and return: y
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
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Client Server
Offline Phase:
(uj, vj, aux) = RandG,g(j, aux) for j = 1, . . . , c
Online Phase:
j1, . . . , jm ∈R {1, . . . ,m}
zj1 := u1, . . . , zjc−1 := uc−1, zjc := x− uc mod q
zjc+1 , . . . , zjm ∈R Zq ”decoy elements”
z1,··· ,zm−−−−−→ for j = 1, . . . ,m
w1,··· ,wm←−−−−− wj := gzj
if wj1 6= vj1 or wj2 6= vj2 or . . . or wjc−1 6= vjc−1 then
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes y := wjc ∗ vjc
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1:
Properties of protocol (C, S):
1. The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection.
• With respect to round complexity: only one round complexity
– One message from C to S followed by one message from S to C (i.e.
mc = 2.)
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• With respect to communication complexity: the protocol requires the trans-
fer of m elements in Zq and m elements in G (i.e. zm, · · · , zm ∈ Zq and
wm, · · · , wm ∈ G). Thus cc = 2m.
• With respect to running time complexity:
– S runs m exponentiation operations.
– C runs c offline phase group exponentiations, tP = c, using pseudo random
power generator and 1 online phase multiplication operation in G, tC = 1.
2. The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow
the protocol, C’s equality verification in step 3 will be satisfied, and thus C’s output
is 6=⊥ and satisfies:




which is y = FG,exp,g(x) for each x ∈ Zq.
3. The privacy property follows by observing that the messages z1, . . . , zm sent by C do
not leak any information about x ∈ Zq. Notice that u1, · · · , uc are computationally
indistinguishable from random elements in Zq by the property 3 of pseudo-random
(G, g)-power generator. Thus, the values z1, · · · , zm are also indistinguishable from
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elements in Zq, because C sets zj1 := u1, . . . , zjc−1 := uc−1, zjc := x−uc mod q and
C randomly and independently chooses zjc+1 , . . . , zjm ∈ Zq when c < m. Therefore,
the messages z1, · · · , zm sent by C do not leak any information about x.
4. To show the security property against any malicious S, we first write several proper-
ties and then write the proof for the security property with several cases of different
values of c. In order to prove the security property, we need to find an upper bound
for εs, where εs stands for the probability that S convinces C to output a y such
that y 6= FG,exp,g(x). We define the following events on input x ∈ Zq to C, for the
protocol (C, S):
• ey 6=F , meaning that ’C’s outputs y such that y 6= FG,exp,g(x)’
• ey=F , meaning that ’C’s outputs y such that y = FG,exp,g(x)’
• e⊥, meaning that ’C’s outputs ⊥’
Note that in the protocol (C, S), the events ey 6=F , ey=F , e⊥ are mutually exclusive
and one of them must occur at the end of the protocol. The following properties
holds for those events:
Observation 3.3.1. Event ey 6=F holds if and only if event (ey=F ∪ e⊥)c (or using
De morgan Law we can writing (ey=F )
c ∩ (e⊥)c) holds.
Recall that the message (z1, . . . , zm) is sent by C to S in step 1 during the online
phase instruction and the message (w1, . . . , wm) is sent by S to C in step 2, where
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S calculates wj := g
zj(= FG,exp,g(zj)). Let us define
• nW= as the set {j|wj = FG,exp,g(zj)}, the number of equality for all wjs
• nW6= as the set {j|wj 6= FG,exp,g(zj)}, the number of inequality for all wjs.
Notice that:
(a) (nW=, nW6=) is a partition of {1, . . . ,m}.
(b) C does not output ⊥ whenever for all j1 ∈ nW=, . . . , jc−1 ∈ nW=, because C
checks in last step if wj1 6= vj1 or wj2 6= vj2 or . . . or wjc−1 6= vjc−1 then returns
⊥.
(c) C does not output y = FG,exp,g(x) whenever jc ∈ nW6=.
The following observation holds as described above in mathematical terminology:
Observation 3.3.2. It holds that:
(a) Pr[(e⊥)
c] = Pr[j1 ∈ nW= ∩, . . . ,∩jc−1 ∈ nW=],
(b) Pr[(ey=F )
c] = Pr[jc ∈ nW6=]
Since S can be malicious, let us observe the following:
• Could nW= be the empty set?
If nW= = ∅ then S sends to C incorrect wi’s for all i = 1, . . . ,m. But then
the protocol halts by sending the failure symbol, ⊥, since C’s check in the last
step.
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• Could a malicious S choose the wi as some arbitrary function of the message
(z1, . . . , zm), as well as other public information?
Observe that S cannot choose these messages because C randomly chooses
j1, . . . , jm from the set of {1, . . . ,m} in step 1 of the protocol. In other words,
C ”shuffles” all indices of zj before sending values to S. So, S gets elements
(z1, . . . , zm), which are uniformly and independently distributed in Zq. The
following observation holds:
Observation 3.3.3. The distribution of values w1, . . . , wm ∈ G is independent
from the distribution of values j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
This observation is important while studying the strategies available S, this
observation implies that S cannot compute wi based on the random values
j1, . . . , jm chosen by C in step 1.
In the remainder of the proof of security, we compute the upper bound for εs,
meaning maximal probability for S to convince C of an incorrect output, i.e. the
maximum probability of the event ey 6=F . We prove the bound by proving in four
different cases, where each case depends on a different value of c in the protocol
(C, S).
Case 1. c = 2.
In this case
• C has to generate 2 precomputed group exponentiations with random
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exponents in Zq using the pseudo random power generator. To construct
the message z1, . . . , zm, one of the values is used to mask the input x in
step 1 and the other value is used in the inequality check in step 3.
• C has to choose m − 2 random decoy elements in Zq to construct the
message z1, . . . , zm in step 1 of the protocol.
We calculate the probability of the event ey 6=F as follows:
Pr[ey 6=F ] = Pr[(ey=F )
c ∩ (e⊥)c] by Observation 1
= Pr[(e⊥)
c] Pr[(ey=F )
c|(e⊥)c] by conditional probability










by definitions of nW=, nW6=
Note that since S can be malicious, it can choose (w1, . . . , wm) arbitrarily. But
we look for the maximum probability of the above calculation, thus we want to
find the maximum probability of |nW=|(m−|nW=|)
m(m−1) . Let us relabel this probability
as the function f(j) := j(m−j)
m(m−1) , and use calculus to find the maximum of this
function.
• First take the derivative: f ′(j) = m−2j
m(m−1)
• Set the derivative to zero (i.e. f ′(j) = m−2j
m(m−1) = 0) in order to find the
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Note that we consider the floor or ceiling of m/2 because we need an
integer value.























), in which case we obtain that εs = Pr[ey 6=F ] =
m
4(m−1) . Hence,
as m increases εs gets closer to 1/4.
Comparing to Theorem 3.1.1, we can conclude that by using m − 2 random
decoy elements in Zq in C’s message reduces the probability from 1/2 to almost
1/4, while requiring no additional computation of group multiplication from
C.
Case 2. c = 3
In this case:
• C has to generate 3 precomputed group exponentiations with random
exponents in Zq using the pseudo random power generator to construct
the message z1, . . . , zm. One of these values is used to mask the input x
in step 1, and the other two values are used to contact the two inequality
checks in step 3.
• C has to choose m− 3 random decoy elements in Zq to creat the message
z1, . . . , zm in step 1 of the protocol.
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We calculate the probability of the event ey 6=F as follows:





= Pr[j1, j2 ∈ nW=] Pr[j3 ∈ nW6=|j1, j2 ∈ nW=]




















Note that since S can be malicious, it can choose (w1, . . . , wm) arbitrarily. We
want to calculate the maximum of this probability. Thus, we find the maximum
probability of |nW=|(|nW=|−1)(m−|nW=|)
m(m−1)(m−2) . Let us relabel this fraction as a function
f(j) :=












and calculus to find the maximum.
• First take the derivative: f ′(j) = 2mj−3j2−m+2j
m(m−1)(m−2)
• Set f ′(j) to zero (i.e. f ′(j) = m−2j
m(m−1) = 0) in order to find the critical
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, in which case we obtain that
εs = Pr[ey 6=F ] = 0.15041 <
1
6
when m = 100
εs = Pr[ey 6=F ] = 0.14837 when m = 1000
Hence, as m increases, εs gets closer to 1/7.
Comparing this with Theorem 3.1.1, we can conclude that by using m − 3
random decoy elements in Zq as part of C’s message along with 1 additional
precomputed exponentiation of a random exponent reduces the probability
from 1/2 to almost 1/7, while requiring no additional computation of group
multiplication from C in the online phase.
Case 3. c = 4, 5, . . . ,m− 1
In this case
• C has to generate c precomputed group exponentiations with random ex-
ponents using the pseudo random power generator in Zq to its message
z1, . . . , zm. One of the values is used to mask the input x in step 1 and
the other c− 1 are used to construct inequality checks in step 3.
• C has to choose m − c random decoy elements in Zq to its message
z1, . . . , zm in step 1.
We calculate the probability of the event ey 6=F similarly as we did for c = 2
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and c = 3 as follows:





= Pr[j1, j2 . . . , jc−1 ∈ nW=] Pr[jc ∈ nW6=|j1, . . . , jc−1 ∈ nW=]




























As in the previous cases, note that since S can be malicious, he can choose
(w1, . . . , wm) arbitrarily. But we want to calculate maximum probability of






























To analyze the function f(j)
• using differentiation does not work with the high-degree polynomial.
• using the upper and lower bound of the binomial coefficient are too loose.
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• using tool based trend analysis shows that this ratio approximately behaves
like O(1
c
) when studied as the function of c.
When we evaluated εs (the above equation) for all values of c numerically, we
noticed
• improved efficiency on the number tC (i.e. C’s group multiplication during
the protocol)
• number of tP (i.e. C’s group exponentiation with random exponent during
offline phase) increases slightly
• by looking of all values of c, the obtained εs is smaller than what could





executions of the atomic protocol
from Section 3.1
• for the values c = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 guarantee improved efficiency on tC
without making tP much worse
• staring from c = 10, the dependency of this protocol for the value tP gets
larger than the one for the protocol in Section 3.2
The Table 3.1 reports εs when c and m change:
Note that when c = 4, . . . , 9, the value εs in the Table 3.1 above is strictly
smaller than the value 2bc/2c that could be obtained by using Section 3.2.
However, when c = 10, the value εs = 0.03894 > .0312 = 2
−5. Thus the
protocol from Section 3.2 is better than using the above protocol. Thus, we are
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL GROUP EXPONENTIATION 61
Table 3.1: Values of εs for protocol (C, S) when c = 2, . . . , 10 and different m
c = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m = 10 .27778 .17500 .13333 .11111 .10000 .10000 .10000 .10000 .10000
m = 20 .26316 .15965 .11739 .09391 .07982 .06842 .06316 .05789 .05263
m = 40 .25641 .15395 .11106 .08912 .07249 .06219 .05465 .04918 .04442
m = 60 .25424 .15196 .10912 .08551 .07053 .06024 .05117 .04692 .04232
m = 80 .25316 .15095 .10818 .08457 .06963 .05930 .05169 .04588 .04135
m = 100 .25252 .15041 .10763 .08403 .06906 .05874 .05117 .04538 .04080
m = 1000 .25025 .14837 .10568 .08212 .06718 .05685 .04928 .04350 .03894
only interested in this protocol when c < 10. We compared the two protocols
numerically in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2: Comparison of this protocol for m = 100 and the protocol from Section 3.2.
Let R be the number of repetitions of the same protocol.
Table 3.3: This Protocol
R c = tP tC εs
1 2 1 .25
1 4 1 .1076274
1 6 1 .067181234
1 8 1 .051172087
1 10 1 .040799532
Table 3.4: Protocol in Section 3.2
R tP tC εs
1 2 1 .5
2 4 2 .25
3 6 3 .125
4 8 4 .0625
5 10 5 .03125
Comparing this protocol with Theorem 3.1.1, we can conclude that by using
m− c random elements (i.e. decoy elements) in Zq as part of C’s message and
c − 2 additional precomputed exponentiations of a random exponent reduces
the probability from 1/2 to approximately O(1
c
), while requiring no additional
computation of group multiplication from C.
Case 4. c = m
In this case
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• C has to generate m precomputed group exponentiations with random
exponents using the pseudo random power generator in Zq to construct
the message z1, . . . , zm. One of these values is used to mask C’s input x
in step 1 and the another m − 1 are used to construct m − 1 inequality
checks in step 3.
• C does not have to choose any random decoy elements in Zq to its message
z1, . . . , zm in step 1.
We calculate the probability of the event ey 6=F as above for c = 2, . . . ,m − 1
as follows:











However, the protocol requires m precomputed exponentiations of random ex-
ponents which is higher than the cost incurred by the protocol in Section 3.2,
in order to reach the same security probability.
Therefore, we complete the proof of correctness, efficiency, privacy and security
properties in this protocol.
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3.3.2 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Security Er-
ror Reduction an Atomic Execution for Fixed-Exponent
Variable-Base Group
This subsection is similar to the previous subsection, the difference is we use the function
FG,exp,k : G → G denoted as FG,exp,k(x) = xk. We will write the theorem and protocol
which satisfies the theorem.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let σ, λ be security parameters, c,m be protocol parameters and let k be
a positive integer and assume the exitance of a pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator.
There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of
function FG,exp,k which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, where εs is constant that depends on parameter c
(see Table 3.1 for exact values, ranging between 0.10763, for c = 2,m = 100, to
0.04080 for c = 9,m = 100)
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0
4. efficiency with parameter (tP , tF , tS, tP , , cc,mc), where
• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = m group exponentiations in G and = 1 inversion in G
• tP is = c group exponentiations using RandG,k.
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• tC is = 5 group multiplication in G
• cc = 2m+ 2 elements in G and mc = 2
We remark that Theorem 3.3.2 satisfies much better security probability achievement
in an atomic protocol on the function FG,exp,k : G → G denoted as FG,exp,k(x) = xk. C
only performs 5 group multiplications in G during the protocol, compared to the atomic
protocol in Theorem 3.1.2, where the security probability is εs = 2
−1. However, the
other metrics increase, specifically the number of group exponentiations by S (i.e. tS)
and the number of pre-computed group exponentiations with random exponents using the
pseudo random power generator. In addition, there would be described in the protocol the
existence of other comparisons for specific values of parameter c as in previous subsection.
Formal description of protocol (C, S). We describe the client- server (C, S) protocol
for the function FG,exp,k. We will use Theorem A.0.1 in Appendix A on (Cinv, Sinv) for
delegated computation of inverses in the group G.
Input to S: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,k), parameters 1
c, 1m
Input to C: 1σ, desc(FG,exp,k), x ∈ G, aux = RandG,k(0) parameters 1c, 1m
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (uj, vj, aux) = RandG,k(j, aux), for j = 1, . . . , c;
Online phase instructions:
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1. C randomly chooses distinct j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
C sets zj1 := u1, . . . , zjc−1 := uc−1, zjc := x ∗ uc;
C randomly and independently chooses zjc+1 , . . . , zjm ∈ G when c < m;
C runs Cinv on input vc, thus obtaining d;
C sends z1, . . . , zm, d to S;
2. S computes wj := z
e
j for j = 1, . . . ,m;
S runs Sinv on input d, thus obtains e;
S sends w1, . . . , wm, e to C;
3. C runs Cinv on input vc, d, e to compute v
−1
c ;
if this execution of (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
if wj1 6= vj1 or wj2 6= vj2 or . . . or wjc−1 6= vjc−1
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes y := wjc ∗ vjc and return: y
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(uj, vj, aux) = RandG,k(j, aux) for j = 1, . . . , c
Online Phase:
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j1, . . . , jm ∈R {1, . . . ,m}
zj1 := u1, . . . , zjc−1 := uc−1, zjc := x ∗ uc
zjc+1 , . . . , zjm ∈R G ”decoy elements”
Cinv(vc) = d
z1,··· ,zm,d−−−−−−→ wj := zkj for j = 1, . . . ,m
w1,··· ,wm,e←−−−−−− Sinv(d) = e
Cinv(vc, d, e) = v
−1
c
if (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
if wj1 6= vj1 or wj2 6= vj2 or . . . or wjc−1 6= vjc−1
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes y := wjc ∗ v−1jc
Proof of Theorem 3.3.2: Proof follows similarly as the proof of Theorem 5
3.4 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Secu-
rity Error Reduction with Multiple Execution
In this section we decrease the security probability to some εs = 2
−λ while requiring a
small number of group multiplications by the client using previous section. We can make
a protocol similar to the previous section, using the idea of parallel repetition of Section
3.2. In this case, we can a get security probability of εs = 2
−λ and not too many group
multiplications from C (i.e. tC), but we require more precomputed exponentiation of
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random exponent tP using the pseudo random power generator.
Let us define the client-server protocol as (CR, SR) which stands for parallel repetition
of R executions of client-server protocol (C, S) in Section 3.3.
3.4.1 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Security Error
Reduction with Multiple Execution for Fixed-Base Vari-
able Exponent Group
In this subsection, we work on the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G, denoted as FG,exp,g(x) = gx.
We will write the theorem and the protocol which satisfies this theorem. Then, we prove
the theorem by showing correctness, efficiency, privacy, and security requirements.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let σ, λ be security parameters and c,m be protocol parameters. There
exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (CR, SR) for delegated computation of func-
tion FG,exp,g which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0









• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = m ·R group exponentiations in G
• tP is = c ·R group exponentiations with random exponents in Zq
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• tC is = R group multiplications in G
• cc = m ·R elements in G and m ·R elements in Zq
• mc = 2.
Formal description of the protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G, x ∈ Zq, aux = RandG,g(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,g(ij, aux), for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 1, . . . , c;
Online phase instructions:
1. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
C randomly chooses distinct j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
C sets zi,j1 := ui,1, . . . , zi,jc−1 := ui,c−1, zi,jc := x ∗ ui,c;
C randomly and independently chooses zi,jc+1 , . . . , zi,jm ∈ G when c < m;
C sends zi,1, . . . , zi,m to S;
2. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
S computes wi,j := g
zi,j for j = 1, . . . ,m;
S sends wi,1, . . . , wi,m to C
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3. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
if wi,j1 6= vi,j1 or wi,j2 6= vi,j2 or . . . or wi,j−1 6= vi,jc−1
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,jc ∗ vi,jc
if y1 = · · · = yλ
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Let i = 1, . . . , λ
Client Server
Offline Phase:
(ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,g(ij, aux) for j = 1, . . . , c
Online Phase:
j1, . . . , jm ∈R {1, . . . ,m}
zi,j1 := ui,1, . . . , zi,jc−1 := ui,c−1, zi,jc := x− ui,c mod q
zi,jc+1 , . . . , zi,jm ∈R G random elements
zi,1,··· ,zi,m−−−−−−→
wi,1,··· ,wi,m←−−−−−−− wi,j := gzi,j for j = 1, . . . ,m
if wi,j1 6= vi,j1 or wi,j2 6= vi,j2 or . . . or wi,jc−1 6= vi,jc−1 then
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
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C computes yi := wi,jc ∗ vi,jc
if y1 = · · · = yλ then
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1: Properties of the protocol is similar to the proof of Theorem
3.1.2 and Theorem 3.2.1.
We report numerical evaluations of the main parameters of our protocol for c = 2
applied in Section 3.2, and for c = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 for this section in the following Tables
3.5-3.7. We write three similar Tables for parameter m, specifically for m = 10, 40, 100.
As you may notice, when m increases, the number of repetitions decrease for εs = 2
−128,
which is a fixed number. Number of repetitions is dependent on εs for atomic operations,
given in Table 3.1 in the previous section.
Table 3.5: Efficiency parameters of (CR, SR) when m = 10 and c = 2, . . . , 9.
R εs tP tC tS
c = 2 (Sec.3.2) 128 2−128 256 128 256 exponentiations
c = 2 (Sec.3.4) 70 2−128 140 70 70m exponentiations
c = 3 51 2−128 153 51 51m exponentiations
c = 4 45 2−128 180 45 45m exponentiations
c = 5 41 2−128 205 41 41m exponentiations
c = 6 39 2−128 234 39 39m exponentiations
c = 7 39 2−128 273 39 39m exponentiations
c = 8 39 2−128 312 39 39m exponentiations
c = 9 39 2−128 351 39 39m exponentiations
In these Tables we include only c = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. We could calculate for c =
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Table 3.6: Efficiency parameters of (CR, SR) when m = 40 and c = 2, . . . , 9.
r εs tP tC tS
c = 2 (Sec.3.2) 128 2−128 256 128 256 exponentiations
c = 2 (Sec.3.4) 66 2−128 132 66 66m exponentiations
c = 3 48 2−128 144 48 48m exponentiations
c = 4 41 2−128 164 41 41m exponentiations
c = 5 36 2−128 180 36 36m exponentiations
c = 6 34 2−128 204 34 34m exponentiations
c = 7 32 2−128 224 32 32m exponentiations
c = 8 31 2−128 248 31 31m exponentiations
c = 9 30 2−128 270 30 30m exponentiations
Table 3.7: Efficiency parameters of (CR, SR) when m = 100 and c = 2, . . . , 9.
r εs tP tC tS
c = 2 (Sec.3.2) 128 2−128 256 128 256 exponentiations
c = 2 (Sec.3.4) 65 2−128 130 65 65m exponentiations
c = 3 47 2−128 141 47 47m exponentiations
c = 4 40 2−128 160 40 40m exponentiations
c = 5 36 2−128 180 36 36m exponentiations
c = 6 34 2−128 204 34 34m exponentiations
c = 7 32 2−128 224 32 32m exponentiations
c = 8 30 2−128 240 30 30m exponentiations
c = 9 29 2−128 261 29 29m exponentiations
10, 11, . . . ,m numerically, so the protocol reduces the number of multiplication (i.e. tC)
and number of repetitions. However, as mentioned before, starting c = 10 (please refer to
Table 3.2), the protocol offers more group exponentiations with a random exponent (i.e.
tP ) from the offline phase than the protocol from Section 3.2.
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3.4.2 Delegating Exponentiation with Improved Security Error
Reduction with Multiple Execution for Fixed-Exponent
Variable-Base Group
This subsection is similar to the previous subsection, the only difference is that we apply
the previous protocol on the function FG,exp,k : G → G denoted as FG,exp,k(x) = xk. We
will write the theorem and the protocol which satisfies the theorem.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let σ, λ be security parameters and c,m be protocol parameters and let k
be a positive integer and assume the exitance of a pseudo-random (G, k)-powers generator.
There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (CR, SR) for delegated computation
of function FG,exp,k which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0









• tF is = 1 group exponentiation in G
• tS is = m ·R group exponentiations in G
• tP is = c ·R group exponentiations with random exponents in G using pseudo-
random (G, k)-powers generator.
• tC is = 5 ·R group multiplications in G
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• cc = (2m+ 2) ·R elements in G and mc = 2.
Formal description of the protocol (C, S). We describe the client-server (C, S)
protocol for the function FG,exp,k. We use Theorem A.0.1 in Appendix A on (Cinv, Sinv)
for delegated computation of inverses in a group G.
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k)
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,k), x ∈ G, aux = RandG,k(0)
Protocol instructions:
Offline phase instructions:
1. C computes (ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,k(ij, aux), for i = 1, . . . , λ and j = 1, . . . , c;
Online phase instructions:
1. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
C randomly chooses distinct j1, . . . , jm ∈ {1, . . . ,m};
C sets zi,j1 := ui,1, . . . , zi,jc−1 := ui,c−1, zi,jc := x ∗ ui,c;
C randomly and independently chooses zi,jc+1 , . . . , zi,jm ∈ G when c < m;
C runs Cinv on input vi,c, thus obtaining di;
C sends zi,1, . . . , zi,m, di to S;
2. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
S computes wi,j := z
k
i,j for j = 1, . . . ,m;
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S runs Sinv on input di, thus obtains ei;
S sends wi,1, . . . , wi,m, ei to C
3. For each i = 1, . . . , λ
C runs Cinv on input vi,c, di, ei to compute v
−1
i,c ;
if this execution of (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output for some i = 1, . . . , λ
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
if wi,j1 6= vi,j1 or wi,j2 6= vi,j2 or . . . or wi,jc−1 6= vi,jc−1
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,jc ∗ vi,jc
if y1 = · · · = yλ
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Illustration of the Protocol (C, S):
Let i = 1, . . . , λ
Client Server
(ui,j, vi,j, aux) = RandG,k(ij, aux) for j = 1, . . . , c
j1, . . . , jm ∈R {1, . . . ,m}
zi,j1 := ui,1, . . . , zi,jc−1 := ui,c−1, zi,jc := x ∗ ui,c
zi,jc+1 , . . . , zi,jm ∈R G random elements
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Cinv(vi,c) = di
zi,1,··· ,zi,m,di−−−−−−−−→ wi,j := zki,j for j = 1, . . . ,m
wi,1,··· ,wi,m,ei←−−−−−−−− Sinv(di) = ei
Cinv(vi,c, di, ei) = v
−1
i,c
if (Cinv, Sinv) returned ⊥ as output for some i = 1, . . . , λ
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
if wi,j1 6= vi,j1 or wi,j2 6= vi,j2 or . . . or wi,jc−1 6= vi,jc−1 then
C returns ⊥ and protocol halts;
C computes yi := wi,jc ∗ v−1i,jc
if y1 = · · · = yλ then
C returns y1
else C returns ⊥
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2: properties of the protocol satisfies similar as the proof of Theorem
3.2.1 and Theorem 3.3.1.
Chapter 4
Cyclic Groups Exponentiation
In this chapter we show a client-server protocol (C, S) which satisfies correctness, security,
privacy and efficiency requirements for delegated computation of exponentiation in the
cyclic group, in the model where the adversary corrupting the server can be malicious.
We present an efficient atomic protocol in Section 4.1 using the idea of probabilistic check
which satisfies four requirements where the security probability is 2−λ. Next, we present a
protocol in Section 4.2, which is similar as the protocol in Section 4.1, but the number of
C’s multiplication in the online phase is much lower; this protocol achieves the following
efficiency tradeoff: it reduces the number of the client’s group multiplications during the
online phase, while it increases the number of group exponentiations of random exponents
during the offline phase and the number of the server’s group exponentiations. Both
of these protocols achieve much better efficiency and security properties in one atomic
protocol, in comparison with the protocols in Chapter 3. In other words in Chapter 3, we




but this protocol can run only once and achieve εs =
1
2λ
. We start the presentation of the
76
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two protocols with group notations that are relevant to both protocols.
Group notations. Let ` denote the length of the binary representation of a group’s
elements. We say that a group is efficient if its description is short (i.e., has length
polynomial in `), its associated operation ∗ and the inverse operation are efficient (i.e.,
they can be executed in time polynomial in `). Let (G, ∗) be an efficient cyclic group of
order q with generator g. Let y = gx denote the exponentiation (in G) of g to the x-th
power; i.e., the value y ∈ G such that g ∗ · · · ∗ g = y, where the multiplication operation
∗ is applied x− 1 times. Let Zq = {0, 1 . . . , q − 1}, and let FG,exp,g : Zq → G denote the
function that maps every x ∈ Zq to the exponentiation (in G) of g to the x-th power.
4.1 Basic Delegation of Exponentiation
in Cyclic Groups
In this section we present a client-server protocol for delegated computation of group
exponentiation in a cyclic group. First, we formally state the result of the protocol,
then we describe the delegation of the protocol, and finally prove its correctness, security,
privacy and efficiency properties.
Formal theorem statement. We show the following
Theorem 4.1.1. Let (G, ∗) be an efficient cyclic group of order q, let σ be its computa-
tional security parameter, and let λ be a statistical security parameter. There exists (con-
structively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of function FG,exp,g
which satisfies
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1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ;
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF = texp(σ);
• tS = 2 · texp(σ);
• tP = 2 · texp(σ) with random exponents in Zq;
• tC = texp(λ) + 3;
• cc = 4 elements in G and mc = 2.
We remark that Theorem 4.1.1 satisfies significantly better efficiency, to achieve security
parameter εs = 2
−λ. Specifically,
• the client’s number of exponentiations with random exponent using the pseudo
random power generator during the offline phase is small constant (i.e. = 2)
• the client’s number of multiplications using square and multiply algorithm is at
most 2λ + 3 = 259 (or using the algorithm described in [8], or [24] is at most 177
or 149 respectively) when λ = 128. Note that 2λ + 3 = 259 is much smaller than
the non delegated square and multiply algorithm 2σ = 4096 where σ equals to 2048
which is the recommended parameter setting.
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Now we describe the protocol satisfying Theorem 4.1.1.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). In previous protocols, the verification of
server computations were based on deterministic tests and repetitions of an atomic pro-
tocol with (in almost all cases) constant security probability. In this section, we consider a
family of protocols which differs on both of these aspects: there is no repetition of atomic
protocols, and probabilistic tests are used. This is helpful in some ways, for instance: the
lack of repetition of an atomic protocol keeps a low number of exponentiations computed
in the offline phase, and the use of probabilistic tests allows a significant reduction of
the security probability with at most a small number of test equations. Specifically, for
this section’s protocol in cyclic groups, C injects an additional random element into the
inputs on which S is asked to compute the value of the function F to satisfy the following
properties: (a) if S returns correct computations of F , then C can use these random val-
ues in a probabilistic test to correctly compute y, (b) if S returns incorrect computations
of F , then S can pass C’s verification only for very few possible values of the random
elements, (c) C’s messages hide the values of the random element as well as C’s input to
the function. By choosing a large domain from which this random value is chosen, the
protocol achieves a very small security probability, without the need for repetition.
The probabilistic test we use is based on an equation that involves the answer from S,
a correct exponentiation computed in the offline phase, and the potential function output
computed using the answer from S and another correct exponentiation computed in the
offline phase. Only one of these values is exponentiated to an exponent that is ≤ 2λ by
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C, which can be much smaller than |G|. In itself, this probabilistic test is not always
successful, but we characterize the condition under which it fails, and this condition can
be expressed as 2 computationally simple deterministic tests: a group membership and a
value distinctness test, both of which can be efficiently checked by C. The distinctness test
removes from this protocol the capability of delegating exponentiation to the exponent 0,
which is not a practical concern.
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ G
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), x ∈ Zq, g ∈ G
Offline phase instructions:
1. C randomly chooses ui ∈ Zq, for i = 0, 1
2. C sets vi = g
ui , for i = 0, 1
Online phase instructions:
1. If x = 0
C randomly chooses z0, z1 from Zq and sends z0, z1 to S
C randomly chooses b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}
C sets z0 := (x− u0) mod q, z1 := (b · x+ u1) mod q
C sends z0, z1 to S
CHAPTER 4. CYCLIC GROUPS EXPONENTIATION 81
2. S computes wi := g
zi for i = 0, 1
S sends w0, w1, to C
3. If x = 0
C returns y = 1 and the protocol halts
C computes y := w0 ∗ v0
C checks that y 6= 1, also called the ‘distinctness test’
C checks that w1 = y
b ∗ v1, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
C checks that w0, w1 ∈ G, also called the ‘G-membership test’
if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns y
Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 :
Properties of protocol (C, S):
1. The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection such that
(a) tF is = 1 exponentiation in G (because we need to calculate FG,exp,g(x) = g
x);
(b) S required to calculate 2 exponentiations (i.e. tS is = 2 exponentiation in G);
(c) C is required to calculate 2 exponentiations during the offline phase (i.e. tP is
= 2 exponentiation in G);
(d) During the online phase, C is required to calculate 3 multiplications and 1
exponentiations to a random exponent b which can be at most 2λ. If C uses
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the square and multiply algorithm it takes 1.5σ to calculate in the average
case and 2σ in the worst case. C performs at most 2λ + 3 multiplications
during online phase (i.e. tC is ≤ 2λ + 3 multiplications). Specifically, when
λ = 128 and σ = 2048, then tC ≤ 259 group multiplications by C during the
online phase, but using the square and multiply method, C has to perform, on
average, 3072 multiplications, and 4096 multiplications in the worst case.
(e) With respect to round complexity, the protocol requires one round complexity,
consisting of one message from C to S followed by one message from S to C
(i.e. mc = 2). With respect to communication complexity the protocol requires
two elements in Zq from C and two elements in G from S (i.e. cc = 4).
2. Correctness properties are satisfied if C and S follow the protocol. All three verifi-
cation in step 3 will be satisfied, as follows
(a) ”distinctness test”: y
?
6= 1. Since x 6= 0 and g is generator of G we have
y = w0 ∗ v0 = gz0 ∗ gu0 = gx−u0 ∗ gu0 = gx 6= 1
which implies that u0 6= (x− u0) mod q
(b) ”probabilistic test”: w1
?
= yb ∗ v1. Since
w1 = g
z1 = gbx+u1 = (gx)b ∗ gu1 = yb ∗ v1
(c) ”G-membership test”: w0, w1
?
∈ G. Since wi = gzi for i = 0, 1 and g is a
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generator of G, then we must have wi ∈ G for i = 0, 1.
and thus C outputs y if the protocol does not halt (i.e. 6=⊥) and y = gx as we show
in the ”distinctness test”.
3. The privacy property against a malicious S follows by observing that the messages
(z0, z1) sent by C do not leak any information about x ∈ Zq. This message is a
pair (z0, z1) where z0 = (x − u0) mod q and z1 = b · x + u1 mod q, u0 and u1 are
uniformly and independently distributed in Zq, and thus so are z0 and z1. Therefor,
we can generate two properties from the above reasoning, which we use to prove
security:
(a) (z0, z1) are uniformly and independently distributed in Zq for any input x.
(b) (z0, z1) does not leak any information about b for any input x.
4. To show security property against any malicious S we first write several definitions
and properties and then write the proof of security by finding the upper bound for
εs, where εs stands for the security probability for that S convinces C to output a y
such that y 6= FG,exp,g(x). Similarly, as in chapter 3, we define the following events
on the input x ∈ Zq of C on the protocol (C, S):
• ey 6=F , meaning ’C outputs y such that y 6= FG,exp,g(x)’
• e⊥, meaning ’C outputs ⊥’
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By protocol inspection we observe that if C outputs y where y 6= FG,exp,g(x) then
C does not output ⊥. Thus we obtain the following observation
Observation 4.1.1. If the event ey 6=F holds then the event (e⊥)
c holds.
Now let us define the following events which we use to prove the security require-
ment:
• e1,b defined as ”there exist exactly one b such that the message of S is (w0, w1)
which satisfies w1 = (w0 ∗ v0)b ∗ v1”
• e>1,b defined as ”there exist more than one b such that the message of S is
(w0, w1) which satisfies w1 = (w0 ∗ v0)b ∗ v1”.
By the above definitions, events e1,b and e>1,b are complements of each other. In the
proof of the privacy property of this protocol (C, S), we prove that “for any x, the
message (z0, z1) of C does not leak any information about b”. From this statement
we can note that all values {1, . . . , 2λ} are equally likely to be chosen for b under




The main proof of the security property is to show that any S cannot produce
values w0, w1 in step 2 satisfying all three checks of C in step 3 for two values of
b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ} where 2λ < q = |G|, say b1, b2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}.
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To prove this statement: we know that S can be malicious, in step 2 it can send
correct answer or incorrect answer. In other words, S can send w′i for i = 0, 1 where
w′i = wi or w
′
i 6= wi where wi = gzi . Since the group G is cyclic and g is a generator
of G and C checks that w′i ∈ G in step 3, we can write
w′0 = g
u ∗ w0 and w′1 = gv ∗ w1 for some u, v ∈ Zq
then y = w′0 ∗ v0 = gu ∗w0 ∗ v0 = gu ∗ gx. The goal of a malicious S is to pass three




gv ∗ w1 = (gu ∗ gx)b ∗ gu1
gv ∗ gz1 = gub ∗ gbx+u1
gv ∗ gbx+u1 = gub ∗ gbx+u1
gv = gub
v = ub mod q
Notice that if u = 0 mod q then v = 0 mod q, from the above calculation, which
implies that S is honest then εs = 0. Now consider when S is dishonest. Then u 6= 0
mod q. We want to show that b is unique in this case. If there exist two distinct b1
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and b2 such that
ub1 = v mod q and ub2 = v mod q
then u(b1 − b2) = 0 mod q then b1 − b2 = 0 mod q (i.e. b1 = b2) because u 6= 0
mod q. Which shows that b is unique. Thus we obtain the following observation
Observation 4.1.3. Pr[e>1,b] = 0
Now, we will prove the upper bound εs on the probability of the event ey 6=F as
follows:
εs = Pr[ey 6=F ] ≤Pr[(e⊥)c] by Observation 4.1.1
= Pr[e1,b ∩ (e⊥)c] + Pr[e>1,b ∩ (e⊥)c]
= Pr[e1,b] · Pr[(e⊥)c|e1,b] + Pr[e>1,b] · Pr[(e⊥)c|e>1,b]







The above calculation shows that the security probability can be at most 1
2λ
in one
atomic execution of the protocol.
CHAPTER 4. CYCLIC GROUPS EXPONENTIATION 87
4.2 Delegation of Exponentiation in Cyclic Groups
with Tradeoff Runtime Performance
In this section we present a client-server protocol for delegated computation of group ex-
ponentiation which is similar to the previous section’s protocol for the function FG,exp,g(x)
in a cyclic group G. In this section, the goal is to improve the number of C’s multipli-
cation in the online phase (i.e. to decrease tC). Note that in the last section the most
expensive operation for C is to evaluate one exponentiation with λ bit. In this section
we introduce the protocol where C calculates multiple exponentiations with smaller bit
than λ and evaluates exponentiations by using the techniques introduced in [8, 24].
Formal theorem statement. We show the following
Theorem 4.2.1. Let σ, λ be security parameters along with an integer m, as protocol
parameters. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated
computation of the function FG,exp,g which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;




3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF = texp(σ);
CHAPTER 4. CYCLIC GROUPS EXPONENTIATION 88
• tS = (m+ 1) · texp(σ);
• tP = (m+ 1) · texp(σ) with random exponents in Zq;
• tC = m · texp(λ/m) + 2m+ 1;
• cc = m+ 1 elements in Zq and m+ 1 elements in G
• mc = 2.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). In the previous section we present a correct,
efficient protocol, which satisfies the privacy requirement and the security probability
εs = 2
−λ. Specifically, when λ = 128, the security probability is εs = 2
−128 and C’s online
calculation is tC = 259 modular multiplications using the square and multiply algorithm,
which is slightly more work for computationally weaker devises. In this section, we present
similar a protocol as that is in previous section, which keeps the same security probability
(i.e. εs = 2
−λ) and improves the number of online multiplications by C, specifically the
protocol decreases C’s online multiplication up to 63 i.e. tC = 63 modular multiplications.
In the previous protocol C sends two elements to S in order to get exponentiations for
both of the elements; one is used to evaluate the function FG,exp,g and the other is used
to check the probabilistic test. The most expensive calculation for C is to calculate one
exponentiation in the probabilistic test, which is ≤ 2λ and it costs at most 2λ modular
multiplications for C. In this section, C sends m + 1 elements to S in order to get
exponentiations for those elements; one element is used to evaluate the function FG,exp,g
and m elements are used to check the m probabilistic tests. C performs m exponentiations
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with a fixed base and with exponent ≤ 2d
λ
me which costs for C, in the online phase, only 63
multiplications by using the techniques in [8, 24]. This is compared to the 259 modular
multiplications discussed in the previous section. The protocol achieves the following
efficiency tradeoff: it reduces the number of group multiplications by C during the online
phase, while increasing the number of group exponentiations of random exponents during
the offline phase and the number of the server’s group exponentiations. Now we describe
the protocol as follows:
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g) g ∈ G, parameters 1m, 1b
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), q, and x ∈ Zq, g ∈ G, parameters 1m, 1b
Offline phase instructions:
1. For j = 0, . . . ,m,
C randomly chooses uj ∈ Zq,
C sets vj = g
uj
Online phase instructions:
1. If x = 0
C randomly chooses z0, . . . , zm from Zq and sends them to S
For i = 1, . . . ,m,
C randomly chooses b(i) ∈
{
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C sets z0 = (x− u0) mod q and zi = (b(i) · x+ ui) mod q
C sends z0, . . . , zm to S
2. For j = 0, . . . ,m,
S computes wj = g
zj and sends wj to C
3. If x = 0
C returns y = 1 and the protocol halts
C computes y = w0 ∗ v0
For i = 1, . . . ,m,
C checks that y 6= 1, also called the ‘distinctness test’
C checks that wi = y
b(i) ∗ vi, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
C checks that w0, wi ∈ G, also called the ‘G-membership test’
if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns y
Properties of protocol (C, S): The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspec-
tion. 1.With respect to round complexity, the protocol only requires one round, consisting
of one message from C to S followed by one message from S to C. 2. With respect to
communication complexity, the protocol requires the transfer of m+1 elements in G from
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S to C, and m + 1 elements in Zq from C to S. 3.With respect to runtime complexity,
if x = 0, C randomly chooses m + 1 elements from Zq and returns y = 1 without any
checks, otherwise C performs m+1 exponentiations with random exponents in the offline
phase and S performs m + 1 exponentiations. In the online phase, C performs 2m + 1






The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow the
protocol, and if x = 0, C returns y = 1 = g0. Otherwise C performs three tests which
pass with high probability and C will output y such that y = gx. To see that this is the
correct output, note that
y = w0 ∗ v0 = gz0 ∗ gu0 = gx−u0 ∗ gu0 = gx.
The G-membership test is always passed since wj = g
zj , for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, and g is a
generator of the group G. The probabilistic test is always passed for i = 1, . . . ,m since
wi = g
zi = gb(i)x+ui = (gx)b(i) ∗ gui = yb(i) ∗ vi.
The distinctness test is always passed, since we assume x 6= 0 then −u0 6= (x − u0)
mod q and using the fact that g is a generator of the group G of order q, then we have
v−10 = g
−u0 6= gx−u0 = gz0 = w0, equivalently saying that y = w0 ∗ v0 6= 1. This implies
that C never returns ⊥, and thus returns y which is equal to FG,exp,g by above calculation.
The privacy against a malicious S of the protocol follows, similarly as for the previous
protocols, by observing that C’s only message to S does not leak any information about
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x. This message is (z0, z1, . . . , zm) where z0 = (x−u0) mod q, zi = (b(i) ·x+ui) mod q,
u0 and ui are uniformly and independently distributed in Zq, and thus so are z0 and zi
for all i = 1, . . . ,m. By the same reasoning it satisfies the following two properties for all
j = 0, . . . ,m: (1) for any x, zj are uniformly and independently distributed in Zq; and
(2) for any x, zj do not leak any information about b(i). We will use both facts in the
proof of the security property.
To prove the security property against a malicious S we need to compute an upper bound
εs on the security probability that i.e. the probability S convinces C to output y such
that y 6= FG,exp,g(x). If x = 0, C can calculate FG,exp,g(x) = g0 = 1 and does not need to
check whether S is honest or dishonest. Thus εs = 0 when x = 0. Now, we assume that
x 6= 0. In the online phase of step 1, C chooses randomly and independently b(i) from
from the set of {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me} for each i = 1, . . . ,m. We obtain the following facts.
Observation 4.2.1. The distribution of values b(1), . . . , b(m) ∈ {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me} is ran-
domly and independently chosen by C.
With respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x as input, we define the
following events for all i = 1, . . . ,m:
• e1,b(i), defines as ‘∃ exactly one b(i) such that S’s message (w0, . . . , wm) satisfies
wi = (w0 ∗ v0)b(i) ∗ vi’
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• e>1,b(i), defines as ‘∃ more than one b(i) such that S’s message (w0, . . . , wm) satisfies
wi = (w0 ∗ v0)b(i) ∗ vi’.
By definition, events e1,b(i), e>1,b(i) are complement of each other. By Observation 4.2.1,
C chooses randomly and independently b(i) from the set of {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me} for each i =
1, . . . ,m.
In our proof of the privacy property for (C, S), we show that for any x, C’s message
z0 . . . , zm does not leak any information about b(1), . . . , b(m). This implies that all values
in {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me} are equally likely events for each b(i) when conditioning over the message
(z0, . . . , zm). Then, if the event e1,b(i) is true, the probability that S’s message (w0, . . . , wm)
satisfies the probabilistic test is 1 divided by the number 2d
λ
me of values of b(i) that are still






We now show the main technical claim, saying that if S is malicious then in step 2 of the
protocol it cannot produce values w′0, . . . , w
′
m satisfying all of C’s three tests relative to
two distinct values b1(i), b2(i) ∈ {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me} for each i = 1, . . . ,m:
Since S can be malicious, in step 2 it can send a correct answer or an incorrect answer.
In other words, it can send w′j where w
′
j = wj or w
′
j 6= wj where wi = gzj for each
j = 0, . . . ,m. Since the group G is cyclic, g is a generator of G and C checks in step 3
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that w′j ∈ G, we can write
w′j = g
αj ∗ wj for some αj ∈ Zq and j = 0, . . . ,m
then y = w′0 ∗ v0 = gα0 ∗ w0 ∗ v0 = gα0 ∗ gx. The goal of a malicious S is to pass all three
checks and C’s output y 6= gx then α0 6= 0 mod q. Now, consider ‘probabilistic check’
for each i = 1, . . . ,m:
w′i = y
b(i) ∗ vi
gαi ∗ wi = (gα0 ∗ gx)b(i) ∗ gui
gαi ∗ gzi = gα0b(i) ∗ gb(i)x+ui
gαi ∗ gb(i)x+ui = gα0b(i) ∗ gb(i)x+ui
gαi = gα0b(i)
αi = α0 · b(i) mod q
Notice that if α0 = 0 mod q then αi = 0 mod q for all i = 1, . . . ,m from the above
calculation, and if S is honest then εs = 0. Now, the reverse direction. If αi = 0 mod q
then α0 = 0 because b(i) 6= 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. If there exists some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that αj 6= 0, we want to show that b(j) is unique. Toward contradiction, if there exist
two distinct b1(j) and b2(j) such that
αjb1(j) = α0 mod q and αjb2(j) = α0 mod q
then αj(b1(j)−b2(j)) = 0 mod q then b1(j)−b2(j) = 0 mod q (i.e b1(j) = b2(j)) because
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αj 6= 0 mod q. Which shows that each b(i) is unique for all i = 1, . . . ,m. From this we
obtain the following observation
Observation 4.2.3. Pr[e>1,b(i)] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m
The rest of the proof consists of computing an upper bound εs on the probability of event
ey 6=F . We have the following
Pr[ey 6=F ] ≤ Pr[(e⊥)c]
= Pr[(e⊥)
c ∩ (e1,b(1) ∩ . . . ∩ e1,b(m))] + Pr[(e⊥)c ∩ (e1,b(1) ∩ . . . ∩ e1,b(m))c]
= Pr[((e⊥)
c ∩ e1,b(1)) ∩ . . . ∩ ((e⊥)c ∩ e1,b(m))] + Pr[(e⊥)c ∩ (e>1,b(1) ∪ . . . ∪ e>1,b(m))]
= Pr[((e⊥)
c ∩ e1,b(1)) ∩ . . . ∩ ((e⊥)c ∩ e1,b(m))]
+ Pr[((e⊥)





























where the first inequality follows from Observation 4.1.1 in the previous section, and the
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first, second and third equalities follow from partitioning the event ¬ e⊥ into two disjoint
events using the definition of events e1,b(i) and e>1,b(i), then simplifying the expressions.
The second inequality follows from Observation 4.2.1 The fourth equality follows from
the conditioning rule in probability. The third inequality follows from Observation 4.2.3.
Thus, we obtain that εs = 2
−λ and conclude the proof for the security property for
execution of (C, S).
4.3 Performance Analysis
The performance of our protocols has been expressed in terms of group multiplications
and parameterized by functions texp and texp,m where texp,m := m · texp by definition. We
have two different settings to evaluate group exponentiations to group multiplications in
our protocols:
1. Basic settings uses the square and multiply algorithm to evaluate group exponen-
tiation i.e.
• texp(`) = 2`
• texp,m(`) = 2m`
2. Improved settings uses improved algorithms from the literature to evaluate group
exponentiation. We use the closed-form estimates in [34], also in [8, 19, 33, 35],
for other algorithms claiming improvements without closed-form evaluations. By
studying these we obtain that:
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• texp,G(`) ≈ `(1 + 1log `) using Brauer’s 1939 algorithm
• texp,G,m(`) ≈ `(1 + mlog `) using Yao’s 1976 algorithm
Table 4.1 below compares the performance of efficiency parameters in protocols of
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 with non-delegated computation of the client under both basic (B)
and improved (I) settings.







Section 4.1 Section 4.2
tF
B 2σ 2σ 2σ
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) σ(1 + 1
log σ




B 0 4σ 2σ(m+ 1)
I 0 σ(1 + 2
log σ




B 2σ 2λ+ 3 2mλ′ + 2m+ 1
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) λ(1 + 1
log λ
) + 3 λ′(1 + m
log λ′
) + 2m+ 1
tS
B 0 4σ 2σ(m+ 1)
I 0 σ(1 + 2
log σ
) σ(1 + m+1
log σ
)
εp B & I 0 0 0
εs B & I 0 2
−λ 2−λ
The main takeaway from the table is that by comparing non-delegated evaluation of
exponentiation with our protocols, we have the following analysis:
• our protocol in Section 4.1 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor of about σ/λ with
respect to non-delegated computation when using both basic and improved settings;
• the protocol in Section 4.2 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor of about σ/λ′ when
using improved settings (where λ′ = dλ/me by definition);
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1 2 · texp(σ) = 2, 420 259 149
2 3 · texp(σ) = 2, 607 261 90
3 4 · texp(σ) = 2, 793 263 73
4 5 · texp(σ) = 2, 979 265 66
5 6 · texp(σ) = 3, 165 267 64
6 7 · texp(σ) = 3, 351 269 63
7 8 · texp(σ) = 3, 537 271 64
8 9 · texp(σ) = 3, 724 273 65
9 10 · texp(σ) = 3, 910 275 67
10 11 · texp(σ) = 4, 069 277 69
In Table 4.2, we show performance of our protocols from Sections 4.1 (when m = 1) and
Section 4.2 (for any m). We set σ = 2048, λ = 128 and use both basic and improved
settings in the client’s multiplications. Notice that tC has minimum points at m = 5, 6, 7, 8
in the improved settings. However, we can see that the client’s number of multiplications
in the offline phase (tP ), and the server’s number of multiplications (tS), monotonically
increase as m increase. Note that tP = tS by Theorem 4.2.1. Therefore, we are interested
in the lowest number tC , where m is the smallest. In this case, we consider m = 5 then
tC = 65 and tS = tP = 6 · texp(σ) = 3, 165 with improved settings, using the protocol
in Section 4.2. This can be computed with verses when m = 1 then tC = 145 and
tS = tP = 2, 420 by using the protocol in Section 4.1.
Chapter 5
RSA-type Group Exponentiation
In this chapter we present protocols for delegation of exponentiation in RSA-type groups.
Our first protocol in Section 5.1 consists of an efficient atomic protocol using the idea of
probabilistic checks (as in Chapter 4) with security probability equal to 2−λ. Our second
protocol in Section 5.2 improves the number of C’s multiplications in the online phase
over the first protocol, with the following efficiency tradeoff: it reduces the number of
group multiplications by the client’s during the online phase, while slightly increasing
the number of group exponentiations of random exponents during the offline phase and
the number of group exponentiations by the server. Both protocols satisfy the privacy
and security properties and do not rely on any additional complexity assumptions. We
start the presentation of the two protocols with group notations that are relevant to both
protocols.
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2 + 1, and n = p1p2. Let Z∗n denote the set of integer coprime with n, with order
φ(n), where φ(n) = (p1− 1)(p2− 1) = 4p′1p′2. In the group (Z∗n, ·) · denotes multiplication
modulo n. Let the function Fn,exp,k : Z∗n → Z∗n denote the function that maps every
x ∈ Z∗n to the exponentiation of x to the k-th power modulo n where gcd(k, φ(n)) = 1,
in other words k is relatively prime with 4, p′1 and p
′
2. Note that the order of elements in
Z∗n is one element of the set {1, 2, p′1, p′2, p′1p′2, 2p′1p′2}, proven in [25] Lemma 1.
5.1 Delegation of Exponentiation
in RSA-type Group
In this section we present a client-server protocol for delegated computation of group
exponentiation in RSA-type groups, in the model where the adversary corrupting the
server can be malicious on RSA-type groups. First: we formally state the result of the
section, then describe the delegation protocol, and finally prove its correctness, security,
privacy and efficiency properties.
Formal theorem statement. We show the following
Theorem 5.1.1. Let Fn,exp,k : Z∗n → Z∗n defined as Fn,exp,k(x) = xk where n = p1 ∗ p2,
p1 = 2p
′
1 +1, p2 = 2p
′




2 be large primes with the same-length. Let σ, λ
be security parameters such that 2λ < p′1, p
′
2. There exists (constructively) a client-server
protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of function Fn,exp,k which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
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2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ;
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF = texp(σ) in Z∗n;
• tS = 2 · texp(σ) in Z∗n;
• tP = 2 · texp(σ) with random exponents in Z∗n;
• tC = 2 · texp(λ) + 9 in Z∗n;
• cc = 4 elements in Z∗n and mc = 2.
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(Fn,exp,k), k ∈ Zn, gcd(n, k) = 1
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(Fn,exp,k), x ∈ Z∗n, k ∈ Zn
Offline phase instructions:
1. C randomly chooses ui ∈ Z∗n, for i = 0, 1
C sets vi = u
k
i , for i = 0, 1
Online phase instructions:
1. If x = 1 or x2 = 1 mod n
C randomly chooses z0, z1 from Z∗n and sends z0, z1 to S
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C randomly chooses b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}
C sets z0 := x ∗ u0 mod n, z1 := xb ∗ u1 mod n
C sends z0, z1 to S
2. S computes wi := z
k
i mod n for i = 0, 1
S sends w0, w1, to C
3. if x = 1
C returns y = 1 and the protocol halts
if x2 = 1 mod n
C returns y = x and the protocol halts
C computes y := w0 ∗ v−10
C checks that y2 6= 1, also called the ‘distinctness test’
C checks that w1 = y
b ∗ v1, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
C checks that w0, w1 ∈ Z∗n, also called the ‘Z∗n-membership test’
if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns y
Properties of protocol (C, S): The efficiency properties are verified by protocol in-
spection:
• With respect to round complexity, the protocol only requires one round, consisting
of one message from C to S followed by one message from S to C.
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• With respect to communication complexity, the protocol requires the transfer of 2
elements in Z∗n from S to C and 2 elements in Z∗n from C to S.
• With respect to runtime complexity, if x = 1 or x2 = 1 mod n, C randomly chooses
two elements from Z∗n and sends the elements to S. S performs 2 exponentiations.
Otherwise, C performs 2 exponentiations with a random base during the offline
phase, S performs 2 exponentiations and C performs 6 modular multiplications, 1
modular inversion and 2 exponentiations to a random exponent ≤ 2λ during the
online phase. In the typical setting if λ = 128, then C only performs at most 518
(or an average of 390) group multiplications in Z∗n using the square and multiply
algorithm in the online phase.
The correctness properties are demonstrated by observing that if C and S follow the
protocol then the following holds:
• if x = 1 then C returns y = 1 which is y = 1k = Fn,exp,k(1)
• if x2 = 1 then C returns y = x. Note that
– if the power of x is 2a (any even number in Zn) then x2a = (x2)a = 1a = 1
– if the power of x is 2a+ 1 (any odd number in Zn) then x2a+1 = x2a ∗ x = x
Since gcd(k, φ(n)) = 1, we know that k is an odd positive integer which implies that
y = x = xk = Fn,exp,k(x)
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• Otherwise, C performs 3 tests and outputs y such that y = xk. All three tests
always pass as follows:
– Z∗n-membership test : since wi = zki , for i = 0, 1, and zi ∈ Z∗n
– the probabilistic test: since w1 = z
k
1 = (x
b ∗ u1)k = (xk)b ∗ uk1 = yb ∗ v1
– distinctness test: since we assume if x 6= 1 and x2 6= 1 then y2 = (xk)2 =
(x2)k 6= 1 where gcd(k, φ(n)) = 1.
Thus, C never returns ⊥, but does return y. To see that y is the correct output:
y = w0 ∗ v−10 = zk0 ∗ (uk0)−1 = (x ∗ u0)k ∗ u−k0 = xk.
The privacy against a malicious S follows similarly as in the previous protocols. We want
to show that C’s message to S does not leak any information about x. This message is a
pair (z0, z1) where z0 = (x∗u0) mod n, z1 = xb ∗u1 mod n. u0 and u1 are uniformly and
independently distributed in Z∗n, and thus so are z0 and z1. For the same reason, it satisfies
the following two properties: (1) for any x, z0 and z1 are uniformly and independently
distributed in Z∗n; and (2) any x, z0 and z1 do not leak any information about b. We will
use both facts in the proof of the security property.
To prove the security property against a malicious S we need to compute an upper bound
εs on the security probability that S convinces C to output y such that y 6= Fn,exp,k(x).
If x = 1 or x2 = 1, C does not use the calculation of S; in other words C calculates
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Fn,exp,k(x) = x
k without using w0, w1 ( send by S). Thus εs = 0 in this case. Otherwise,
we use the Observations which were considered in Chapter 4 to find an upper bound
for εs. First we define the following events, similar to the previous section, with slight
changes:
• e1,b, defined as ‘∃ exactly one b such that S’s message (w0, w1) satisfies w1 = (w0 ∗
v−10 )
b ∗ v1’
• e>1,b, defined as ‘∃ more than one b such that S’s message (w0, w1) satisfies w1 =
(w0 ∗ v−10 )b ∗ v1’.
By definition, events e1,b, e>1,b are complementary.
In our proof of the privacy property of (C, S), we proved that for any x, C’s message
(z0, z1) does not leak any information about b. This implies that all values in {1, . . . , 2λ}
are still equally likely even when conditioning over message (z0, z1). Then, if the event
e1,b is true, the probability that S’s message (w0, w1) satisfies the probabilistic test is 1
divided by the number 2λ of values of b that are still equally likely even when conditioning
over message (z0, z1). Thus, the Observation 4.1.2 in precious chapter follows.
The main proof of security is to show Observation 4.1.3, which states that that any S
cannot produce values w0, w1 in step 2 satisfying all three checks of C in step 3 for two
values of b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ} where 2λ < p′1, p′2
To prove this statement we assume, towards the contradiction assume, there exist two
values b1 and b2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2λ}. Without loss of generality assume that b1 > b2 then
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b1 − b2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2λ − 1} which satisfies all three checks. Then
w1 = y
b1 ∗ v1 and w1 = yb2 ∗ v1
yb1 ∗ v1 = yb2 ∗ v1
yb1−b2 = 1
y = w0 ∗ v−10 and C checks that w0, w1 ∈ Z∗n, which implies that y ∈ Z∗n. Note that the
element of Z∗n can have order at most 2p′1p′2 by [25], and y ∈ Z∗n which implies that by
Lagrange Theorem the order of y must divide 2p′1p
′
2 . Since C checks that y
2 6= 1, the
order of y can be greater than or equal to p′1 or p
′
2. The above calculation shows that
yb1−b2 = 1, but 0 ≤ b1 − b2 < p′1, p′2 (because b1 − b2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2λ − 1} and 2λ < p′1, p′2).
This implies that b1 − b2 = 0⇐⇒ b1 = b2. Therefore, b is unique. Thus the Observation
4.1.3 follows.
The rest of the proof consists of computing an upper bound εs on the probability of event
ey 6=F . We have the following
Pr(ey 6=F ) ≤ Pr((e⊥)c)
= Pr(e1,b) · Pr((e⊥)c|e1,b) + Pr(e>1,b) · Pr((e⊥)c|e>1,b)








where the first inequality follows from Observation 4.1.1, the first equality follows from
the definition of events e1,b, e>1,b and the conditioning rule, the second equality follows
from Observation 4.1.3, and the second inequality follows from Observation 4.1.2. We
then obtain that εs = 2
−λ, which concludes the proof for the security property for a single
execution of (C, S).
A Protocol Extension. The above protocol works for the group of Z∗n where n = p1∗p2,
p1 = 2p
′
1+1, p2 = 2p
′




2 are large primes such that |Z∗n| = φ(n) = 4p′1p′2.
Now, we can extend the protocol (C, S) with n = p1 ∗ p2 sand the order of the group Z∗n
is equal to φ(n) = c1 · · · cl · (p′1)α1 · · · (p′h)αh where c1, . . . , cl ∈ Zn and each ci < λ for
i = 1, . . . , l and p′1, . . . p
′
h are prime numbers where each pi > 2
λ for i = 1, . . . , h. Then,
the protocol (C, S) is similar to the previous protocol. The only changes occur when C
checks in the online phase if
• the order of x is smaller than λ (i.e. c1 or . . . or cl) then it can evaluate by itself as
we show above protocol for x = 1 or x2 = 1.
• the order of x is greater than 2λ (i.e. (p′1)α1 or . . . or (p′h)αh) then it can evaluate
by running the same protocol as above.
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5.2 Delegation of Exponentiation in RSA-type
Group Tradeoff Runtime Performance
By directly combining the techniques in Section 5.1 with the input mixing technique from
Section 4.2, we obtain a protocol for delegating exponentiations RSA - type groups. The
proof of the following theorem is a direct combination of proofs of Theorem 4.2.1 and
Theorem 5.1.1
Theorem 5.2.1. Let Fn,exp,k : Z∗n → Z∗n be defined as Fn,exp,k(x) = xk where n = p1 ∗ p2,
p1 = 2p
′
1+1, p2 = 2p
′




2 are large primes with the same length. Let σ, λ
be security parameters and m be a protocol parameter where 2d
λ
me < p′1, p′2. There exists
(constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for delegated computation of the function
Fn,exp,k which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ;
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF = texp(σ) in Z∗n;
• tP = tS = (m+ 1) · texp(σ) in Z∗n;
• tC = 2 · texp,m(λ/m) + 2m+ 7
in Z∗n;
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• cc = 4m elements in Z∗n and mc = 2.
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(Fn,exp,k), k ∈ Zn parameter 1m
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(Fn,exp,k), x ∈ Z∗n, k ∈ Zn parameter 1m
Offline phase instructions:
1. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m
C randomly chooses uj ∈ Z∗n,




1. If x = 1 or x2 = 1 mod n
C randomly chooses z0, z1, . . . , zm from Z∗n and sends them to S
For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
C randomly chooses b(i) ∈ {1, . . . , 2d
λ
me}
C sets z0 := x ∗ u0 mod n and zi := xb(i) ∗ ui mod n
C sends z0, z1, . . . , zm to S
2. For j = 0, 1, . . . ,m
S computes wj = z
k mod n and sends wj to C
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3. if x = 1
C returns y = 1 and the protocol halts
if x2 = 1 mod n
C returns y = x and the protocol halts
C computes y = w0 ∗ v−10
C checks that y2 6= 1, also called the ‘distinctness test’
For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
C checks that wi = y
b(i) ∗ vi, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
C checks that w0, wi ∈ Z∗n, also called the ‘Z∗n-membership test’
if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns y
5.3 Performance Analysis
Similarly to the previous chapter the performance of our protocols has been expressed in
terms of group multiplication and is parameterized by the functions texp and texp,m where
texp,m := m · texp by definition. We have two different settings to evaluate from group
exponentiations to group multiplications in our protocols:
1. Basic setting uses the square and multiply algorithm to evaluate group exponen-
tiation i.e.
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• texp(`) = 2`
• texp,m(`) = 2m`
2. Improved settings uses the improved algorithms from the literature to evaluate
group exponentiation. We use the closed-form estimates in [34], as well as these
in [8, 19, 33, 35] for other algorithms, claiming improvements without closed-form
evaluations. By studying these we obtain that:
• texp,G(`) ≈ `(1 + 1log `) using Brauer’s 1939 algorithm
• texp,G,m(`) ≈ `(1 + mlog `) using Yao’s 1976 algorithm
The Table 5.1 below compares the performance of our protocols in Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2 with non-delegated computation the client under both basic (B) and improved
(I) settings.
The main takeaway from the table is that by comparing non delegated protocols with our
protocols we have the following:
• our protocol in Section 5.1 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor of about σ/λ with
respect to non-delegated computation when using both basic and improved settings;
• the protocol in Section 5.2 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor of about σ/λ′ when
using the improved settings (where λ′ = dλ/me by definition);
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Section 5.1 Section 5.2
tF
B 2σ 2σ 2σ
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) σ(1 + 1
log σ




B 0 4σ 2σ(m+ 1)
I 0 σ(1 + 2
log σ




B 2σ 4λ+ 8 2mλ′ + 2m+ 6
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) 2λ(1 + 1
log λ
) + 9 2λ′(1 + m
log λ′
) + 2m+ 7
tS
B 0 4σ 2σ(m+ 1)
I 0 σ(1 + 2
log σ
) σ(1 + m+1
log σ
)
εp B & I 0 0 0
εs B & I 0 2
−λ 2−λ
In Table 5.2 we show performance of our protocols in Sections 5.1 (when m = 1) and
Section 5.2 (for any m). We set σ = 2048, λ = 128, and use both the basic and the
improved settings in the client’s multiplications. Notice that tC has a minimum point
at m = 8 in the improved settings. However, we can see that the client’s number of
multiplications in the offline phase (tP ), and the server’s number of multiplications (tS),
monotonically increase as m increases. Note that tP = tS by Theorem 4.2.1. Therefore,
we are interested in the lowest number, tC , where m is the smallest. In this case we
consider m = 8 then tC = 119 and tS = tP = 9 · texp(σ) = 3, 724 with improved settings
by using the protocol in Section 4.2. This can be compared to when m = 1, then tC = 302
and tS = tP = 2, 420 by using the protocol in Section 4.1.
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Table 5.2: Efficiency parameters of protocols using square and multiply algorithm and
Yao’s algorithm





1 2 · texp(σ) 521 302
2 3 · texp(σ) 523 182
3 4 · texp(σ) 525 147
4 5 · texp(σ) 527 130
5 6 · texp(σ) 529 124
6 7 · texp(σ) 531 122
7 8 · texp(σ) 533 122
8 9 · texp(σ) 535 119
9 10 · texp(σ) 537 124




In this chapter we propose batch (multiple) verification tests and apply of these tests to the
delegation of client - server multiple exponentiations over Discrete Log type groups. More
specifically, multiple exponentiations in the q-order subgroup Gq of Z∗p, where p = 2q + 1
and p, q are large primes. A group Gq is often used in cryptosystems that base their
security on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem or related problems.
We start by providing some useful number theory definitions and observations in
Section 6.1. Then we show two batch verification of exponentiation tests in Section 6.2.
Then we apply these two verification tests to two delegation of client server protocols
in Section 6.3. Our first protocol, where the client does not hide its inputs from the
server and the client does not have to precalculate in the offline phase is described in
Section 6.3.1. Our second protocol, where the client completely hides the inputs from
the server, and the client performs some calculations in the offline phase is described in
Section 6.3.2. Lastly, we analyze performance in Section 6.4.
114
CHAPTER 6. MULTIPLE EXPONENTIATIONS: DISCRETE LOG 115
6.1 Number Theory Definitions and Properties
Let p = 2q+ 1, for p, q primes. Recall that Z∗p = {1, . . . , p− 1} has a q-order subgroup of
Z∗p, which we denote as Gq. As q is prime, Gq is cyclic. Let g be a generator. Consider
the function Fp,q,g : Zq −→ Gq defined as Fp,q,g(xi) = yi, for yi = gxi mod p for all
i = 1, . . . ,m. Here, p, q, g are assumed to be part of desc(Fp,q,g).
texp(`) is a parameter denoting the number of group multiplications used to compute an
exponentiation of a group value to an `-bit exponent. By tm,exp(`) we denote a parameter
for the number of group multiplications used to compute m exponentiations of the same
group value (also called fixed-base exponentiations) to m arbitrary `-bit exponents. By
tprod,m,exp(`) we denote a parameter for the number of group multiplications used to
compute a product ofm exponentiations of (possibly different) group values tom arbitrary
`-bit exponents.
Definition. An integer y ∈ Z∗p is a quadratic residue modulo p if there exists r ∈ Z∗p such
that r2 = y mod p. An integer y ∈ Z∗p is a quadratic non residue modulo p if there does
not exist an r ∈ Z∗p such that r2 = y mod p.
Euler’s theorem states that for any odd prime p and any a ∈ Z∗p, a is a quadratic residue
modulo p if and only if a(p−1)/2 = 1 mod p. For the considered type of integers p = 2q+1,
with p, q primes, this implies the following
Observation 6.1.1. Gq is the set of quadratic residues in Z∗p.
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The above observation also implies that Z∗p can be partitioned into 2 equal-size sets: the
set of quadratic residues modulo p (i.e., Gq) and the set of quadratic non residues modulo
p (i.e., Z∗p \Gq).
6.2 Batch Verification of Discrete Log Exponintia-
tion
GIVEN: g a generator of Gq, batch instance: (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) with zi ∈ Zq and
values t1, . . . , tn which is calculated as ti = w
q+1
2
i (to check quadratic residue property) for
each i = 1, . . . , n. Note that t1, . . . , tn are needed for Small Exponent Test and are not
necessary for Random Subset Test.
• Random Subset (RS) Test:
CHECK: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: wi ∈ Z∗p and wi = gzi
1. Membership Check: For i = 1, . . . , n,
if wi 6∈ Z∗p then return: ⊥ and halts
2. Repeat the following atomic test, independently λ times and accept iff all
subset tests accept:
ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST
(a) For each i = 1, . . . , n pick bi ∈ {0, 1} at random
(b) Let S = {i : bi = 1}
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(c) Compute z =
∑
i∈S zi mod q and w =
∏
i∈S wi
(d) if gz 6= w
return: ⊥ and protocol halts
return: w1, . . . , wn
• Small Exponents Test:
CHECK: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: wi ∈ Gq and wi = gzi
1. Membership Check: For i = 1, . . . , n,
if ti or wi 6∈ Z∗p then return: ⊥ and halts
if t2i 6= wi mod p then return: ⊥ and halts
2. SE:
(a) Pick s1, . . . , sn ∈ {0, 1}λ at random
(b) Compute z =
∑n





(c) if gz 6= w
return: ⊥ and protocol halts
return: w1, . . . , wn
Note that the above batch verification test is an improvement of the batch verification
test described in [6]. In [6] authors assume the existence of a membership test, however
we are showing how efficiently to check the membership test. Next, we show security
requirements for the above verification test.
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Theorem 6.2.1. Given a group Gq of prime order group q and generator g of Gq. Suppose
(z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect batch instance of the batch verification function Fp,q,g.
Then the
1. ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST accepts batch instance with probability 1/2
2. SMALL EXPONENT TEST accepts batch instance with probability 2−λ
Proof. ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST: Suppose (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect
batch instance of the batch verification problem. Meaning that there exist i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that wi 6= gzi . Let αi = wigzi mod p. Since S can be malicious it may send wi /∈ Gq.
Let us look at three cases for αi:
1. if wi /∈ Z∗p then the Membership Check returns ⊥ and protocol halts.
2. if wi ∈ Z∗p\ Gq then we prove that the protocol does not halt the error (i.e.
Fp,q,g(zi) 6= wi) with probability at most 1/2 similarly as [6]. By assumption there
exist an i such that αi 6= 1, without loss of generality assume that i = 1. Now,











= 1 mod p ⇐⇒
∏
i∈M αi
mod p = 1. Now suppose that T ⊆ {2, . . . , n}. Then note that
∏
i∈T




So if the test succeeds on M = T then it must fail on M = T ∪ {1}. This means
the test must fail on at least half the tests M .
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3. if wi ∈ Gq then the verification test follows from [6] and by assumption, wi 6= zei
then αi 6= 1.
SMALL EXPONENT TEST: Suppose (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect batch in-
stance of the batch verification problem. Meaning that there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that wi 6= gzi . Then, we have the following two cases:
1. if wi /∈ Gq then the Membership Check returns ⊥ and protocol halts because of
Observation 6.1.1
2. if wi ∈ Gq then verification tests follows from [6].
The next theorem describes the number of operations required for each test:
Theorem 6.2.2. Let p, q be large, same-length primes, such that p = 2q+1. Let σ be the
computational security parameter associated with the subgroup Gq of the group Z∗p where
Gq is a prime order group with generator g. Let λ be a statistical security parameter.
Then the cost of the computation of function Fp,q,g on n inputs with
1. RANDOM SUBSET TEST is nλ
2
+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗p
2. SMALL EXPONENT TEST is 2n+ tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in Z∗p
Proof. These two batch verification tests are very similar to the test described in [6]. The
only difference is that each test has Membership Check in first step. Thus, in this theorem,
we need to see the cost of Membership Check and then add it to cost of verification test
discussed in [6].
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• Random Subset Test: The Atomic Random Subset requires about n/2 + texp(σ)
multiplications in Z∗p as described in [6]. However, in order to lower the error to
2−λ, the atomic protocol has to be repeated λ times. Thus, the test performs
nλ
2
+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗p. Note that to check whether wi 6∈ Z∗p, the test
only needs to check that these numbers are in [1, p − 1] (i.e. wi > 0 and wi < p),
which requires time linear in σ. This is a lower-order operation when compared to
multiplication in Z∗p, and we can ignore it in our calculations.
• Small Exponent Test: The test performs m exponentiations to λ-bit exponents,
1 exponentiation to a σ-bit exponent and 2m multiplications. Note that to check
whether ti or wi 6∈ Z∗p, the test only needs to check that these numbers are in
[1, p− 1], which we can ignore it in our calculations.
Note that if we are working with the group Gq which is Z∗p and g is a generator of Gq
then the Random Subset Test works as well as group Gq because Gq is cyclic group and
it is shown in [6] that Random Subset Test works in cyclic group. The difference is that
we do not assume that all wi ∈ Gq for all i = 1, . . . , n, but we show in Membership Check
that wi ∈ Gq.
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6.3 From Batch Verification to Batch Delegation
In this section, we propose two client-server protocols for secure delegated computation
of batch exponentiations in a group Gq where q is prime and g is generator of Gq.We
work in the model where the server can be malicious. Both protocols use two generic
constructions of batch verification tests, described in the previous section. In the first
protocol, the client does not hide the input from the server and the client does not have
to precalculate in the offline phase. In the second protocol, the client hides the input from
the server, but then has to do precalculation in the offline phase. In both protocols, we
first describe the formal description of the protocol (C, S) and then prove the efficiency,
correctness, privacy (if it is applicable), and security requirements.
6.3.1 Protocol 1: Batch Delegation with No Input Privacy or
Offline Phase
Our Protocol 1 satisfies the following:
Theorem 6.3.1. Let p, q be large primes such that p = 2q+1, let σ be the computational
security parameter associated with the q-order subgroup Gq of Z∗p, and let λ be a statistical
security parameter. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for batch
delegation of the computation of Fp,q,g on n inputs, which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ;
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3. (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc)-efficiency, where
• tF is = texp,n(σ)
• tS is = texp,2n(σ)
• cc = n elements in Zq + 2n elements in Z∗p
• tP = 0 and mc = 2.
• tC depends on which verification test C uses:
– Random Subset Test: tC is
nλ
2
+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗p
– Small Exponent Test: tC is 2n + tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in
Z∗p
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S and C: 1σ, 1λ desc(FG,exp,g), x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq, g ∈ Gq
1. C sends x1, . . . , xn to S
2. For i = 1, . . . , n
S computes yi := g




S sends y1, . . . , yn, t1, . . . , tn to C
3. C runs one of the following verification tests for batch instance (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)
and values t1, . . . , tn.
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(a) Random Subset (RS) Test (does not need the values (t1, . . . , tn))
(b) Small Exponent (SE) Test
if the chosen test from above is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns (y1, . . . , yn)
Properties of protocol (C, S): The efficiency properties are verified by protocol in-
spection
• Round complexity: the protocol only requires one round, consisting of one message
from C to S followed by one message from S to C.
• Communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer of n elements from
C to S in Zq and 2n elements from S to C in Z∗p.
• Runtime complexity: S performs 2n exponentiations to σ-bit exponents in Gq C’s
performance depends on what test is used. The cost of the tests was described in
Theorem 6.2.2.
The correctness property follows by showing that if C and S follow the protocol, C always
outputs yi = g
xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. First, we show the Membership Checks performed
by C are always passed. In The Membership Check in Random Subset Test, C checks
if yi ∈ Z∗p by verifying yi are > 0 and < p. This is true because yi is computed by S
as gxi mod p, for i = 1, . . . , n, and g is a generator of group Gq and xi ∈ Zq. In The
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Membership Check in the Small Exponent Test and Test, C checks if yi, ti ∈ Z∗p (yi = t2i








= yq+1i = g
xi(q+1) ≡ gxi = yi mod p
for yi and ti computed by S as yi := g
xi and ti := y
q+1
2
i mod p. Lastly, yi is the correct
output since yi = g
xi computed by S for all i = 1, . . . n.
The security property against a malicious S we need to compute an upper bound εs on
the probability that S convinces C to output a yi such that yi 6= FG,exp,g(x) for some
i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 6.2.1 in the previous section, we showed that for
• ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST satisfies εs = 1/2, i.e (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) is
an incorrect batch instance and C does not return ⊥. However for the Random
Subset Test , C repeats ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST λ times. Thus
εs = 2
−λ.
• Small Exponent Test satisfies εs = 2−λ.
6.3.2 Protocol 2: Batch Delegation with Input Privacy and Of-
fline Phase
Our Protocol 2 satisfies the following:
Theorem 6.3.2. Let p, q be large primes such that p = 2q+1. Let σ be the computational
security parameter associated with the q-order subgroup Gq of Z∗p, and let λ be a statistical
CHAPTER 6. MULTIPLE EXPONENTIATIONS: DISCRETE LOG 125
security parameter. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for batch
delegation of the computation of function Fp,q,g on n inputs, which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, for εs = 2
−λ;
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc)-efficiency, where
• tF is = texp,n(σ)
• tS is = texp,2n(σ)
• cc = n elements in Zq + 2n elements in Z∗p
• tP = 0 and mc = 2.
• tC depends on which verification test C uses:
– Random Subset Test: tC is n(1 +
λ
2
) + texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗p
– Small Exponent Test: tC is 3n + tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in
Z∗p
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), g ∈ Gq
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FG,exp,g), x1, . . . , xn ∈ Zq, g ∈ Gq
Offline phase instructions:
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1. For i = 1, . . . , n
C randomly chooses ui ∈ Zq and sets vi := gui
Online phase instructions:
1. For i = 1, . . . , n
C sets zi := (xi − ui) mod q
C sends z1, . . . , zn to S
2. For i = 1, . . . , n
S computes wi := g




S sends w1, . . . , wn, t1, . . . , tn to C
3. C checks correctness of wi for each i = 1, . . . , n for the given t1, . . . , tn and with
batch instance (z1, w1) . . . , (zn, wn) to one of the following three tests:
(a) Random Subset (RS) Test (it does not need (t1, . . . , tn))
(b) Small Exponent (SE) Test
if the chosen test is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
For i = 1, . . . , n
C sets yi := wi · vi mod q
C returns (y1, . . . , yn)
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Properties of protocol (C, S): The efficiency properties are verified by protocol in-
spection.
• Round complexity: the protocol only requires one round, consisting of one message
from C to S followed by one message from S to C.
• Communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer of 2n elements from
S to C and n elements from C to S in Zq.
• Runtime complexity: During the offline phase C performs n exponentiations in base
g with random σ-bit exponents. Note that known-base exponentiations can be ex-
ecuted faster than unknown-base exponentiation using pre-computation techniques
[8, 19]. During the online phase, S performs 2n exponentiations to σ-bit exponents
in Z∗p. C’s performance depends on what test is used. The cost of it described in
Theorem 6.2.2. If the batch verification test is successfully passed, C performs n
more group multiplications in order to get yi in Z∗p.
The correctness property follows by showing that if C and S follow the protocol, C always
outputs yi = g
xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The Membership Check, performed by C are always
passed, which follows from a similar argument as given Protocol 1. yi is the correct
output, since
yi = wi · vi = gzi · gui = gxi−ui · gui = gxi
for wi computed by S as wi := g
zi which implies that yi = Fp,q,g(xi) for all xi ∈ Zq,
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i = 1, . . . , n.
The privacy property of the protocol against a malicious S follows by observing that
C’s only message to S does not leak any information about xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. This
message is (z1, . . . , zn) where zi = (xi − ui) mod q. The values u1, . . . , un are uniformly
and independently distributed in Zq,
thus so are z1, . . . , zn.
The security property against a malicious S requires an upper bound εs on the security
probability that S convinces C to output a yi such that yi 6= Fp,q,g(x) for some i =
1, . . . , n. Note that the calculation of the correct yi (i.e. yi = Fp,q,g(xi)) depends on
wi, sent by S. εs depends on the probability that C accepts an incorrect batch instance
(z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn). With similar reasoning to that given in the previous subsection,
shows that the security probability is εs = 2
−λ.
6.4 Performance Analysis and Conclusions
The performance of our protocols has been expressed in terms of group multiplications,
and parameterized by functions texp, tm,exp, tprod,m,exp. For a more explicit evaluation, one
can set these 3 parameter functions using a textbook/definition algorithm or an improved
algorithm from the literature (we use the closed-form estimates in [34]. See also [8, 19,
33, 35] for other algorithms claiming improvements without closed-form evaluations).
In Table 6.1 we listed all parameters of the two protocols described in Section 6.3 for
secure batch delegation of exponentiations over the discrete log type groups to a single
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Table 6.1: Efficiency parameter of Protocol 1 and 2 for the function Fp,q,g(xi) = g
xi for
all i = 1, . . . , n







SE: 2n+ tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ)
RS: n(λ
2
+ 1) + texp,λ(σ)









(and possibly malicious) server for the function Fp,q,g(xi) = g
xi , i = 1, . . . , n.
Using the textbook square-and-multiply algorithm, we have that texp(`) = 2` multi-
plications (and, on average, 1.5` multiplications for a random exponent). An improved
algorithm implies the setting texp(`) = ` · (1 + 1/(log `)) for any α > 0. tn,exp(`), by
definition, can be set as n · texp(`) multiplications. An improved algorithm suggests
tn,exp(`) = ` ·(1+n/(log `)). As for tprod,n,exp(`), by definition, it can be set as tn,exp(`)+2n
multiplications; an improved algorithm implies the value ` · (1 + n/(log n+ log `)).
In Tables 6.2 and 6.3 is the concrete performance of protocol 1 and protocol 2 using
batch verification tests Random Subset (RS) and Small Exponent (SE). In Table 6.2, we
set σ = 1024 and λ = 128 (i.e. security probability will be εs = 2
−128). In Table 6.3, we
set σ = 2048 and λ = 128. We count the number of multiplications by the client and
compare with the naive batch test. The test is not naively implemented because we used
an improved algorithm as described above.
• In Table 6.2 observe that the RS test is actually worse than naive for n ≤ 487, and
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Table 6.2: C’s online multiplication for increasing value n with εs = 2
−128, λ = 128, σ =
1024-bits
n Naive
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
RS SE RS SE
5 1,536 20,068 1,333 20,073 1,338
10 2,048 20,388 1,398 20,398 1,408
50 6,144 22,948 1,860 22,998 1,910
100 11,264 26,148 2,392 26,248 2,492
200 21,504 32,548 3,402 32,748 3,602
487 50,892 50,916 6,142 51,403 6,629
1,000 103,424 83,748 10,798 84,748 11,798
5,000 513,024 339,748 44,436 344,748 49,436
10,000 1,025,024 659,748 84,346 669,748 94,346
the SE test is the best, as expected. The factor of improvement increases with n:
at n = 10 we do about 1.45 times better than naive (using SE); at n = 487, about 8
times better (using SE); at n = 5000, about 10.5 times better (using SE)and about
1.5 times better (using RS).
• In Table 6.3 observe that the RS test is actually worse than naive for n ≤ 306, and
the SE test is the best, as expected. The factor of improvement increases with n;
at n = 10 we do about 1.55 times better than naive (using SE); at n = 500 we do
about 12 times better (using SE), and at n = 5000 we do about 20 times better
(using SE) and about 2.55 times better (using RS).
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Table 6.3: C’s online multiplication for increasing value n with εs = 2
−128, λ = 128, σ =
2048-bits
n Naive
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
RS SE RS SE
5 2,978 39,817 2,440 39,822 2,445
10 3,909 40,137 2,506 40,147 2,516
50 11,357 42,697 2,968 42,747 3,018
100 20,666 45,897 3,500 45,997 3,600
200 39,284 52,297 4,510 52,497 4,710
306 59,019 59,081 5,541 59,387 5,847
500 95,138 71,497 7,370 71,997 7,870
1,000 188,229 103,497 11,906 104,497 12,906
5,000 932,957 359,497 45,543 364,497 50,543
10,000 1,863,866 679,497 85,454 689,497 95,454
Chapter 7
Multiple Exponentiations: RSA
In this chapter we propose batch verification tests and the application of these tests to the
delegation of client - server exponentiations over RSA type groups. More specifically in
the group Z∗N , where N = pq with p, q large primes of the form p = 2p1+1, q = 2q1+1, for
primes p1, q1. We proceed similarly to the previous chapter for secure batch verification
test and then application of those verification tests to delegation of client-server protocols
where there is only one server in the protocol and it can be any malicious.
We start by providing useful number theory definitions and observations in Section 7.1.
Then, we show two batch verification of exponentiation tests in Section 7.2 and apply these
two verification tests to two delegation protocols in Section 7.3. Our first protocol, where
the client does not hide inputs from the server and the client does not have to precalculate
in the offline phase, is described in Section 7.3.1. Our second protocol, where the client
completely hides inputs from the server and the client performs some calculations in the
offline phase, is described in Section 7.3.2. Lastly, we show the performance analysis in
Section 7.4.
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7.1 Number Theory Definitions and Properties
Definition. For any prime p and value a ∈ Z∗p, the Legendre symbol (a|p) of a mod p is
defined as +1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo p and −1 otherwise.
Using Euler’s theorem the Legendre symbol can be computed by one exponentiation
modulo p. Exponentiation is expensive.
Let N = pq, for primes p, q. Let see some facts which we use them later:
• For any integer a ∈ Z∗N , we know that v is a quadratic residue modulo c if and only
if (v|b) = 1 for any prime b dividing n (see, e.g., [32]).
• For any a ∈ Z∗N , the Jacobi symbol (a|N) of a mod N is defined as equal to (a|p) ·
(a|q). Thus,
– if (a|N) = −1 then a is a quadratic non residue modulo N , as it is a quadratic
non residue modulo at least one of the primes dividing N .
– if (a|N) = 1 then no efficient algorithm is known to compute whether a is a
quadratic residue or non residue modulo c.
• For any a1, a2 ∈ Z∗N , let ∼N be the relation defined as
a1 ∼N a2 = the quadratic residuosity of a1a2 mod N . We note that ∼N is an
equivalence relation and the set of quadratic residues modulo m is an equivalence
class for this relation;
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• for any a ∈ Z∗N , the set of integers {ar | r is a quadratic residue mod N} is an
equivalence class for this relation. Then Z∗N is divided by relation ∼N into 4 equal-
size equivalence classes:
– one is the class of quadratic residues modulo N ,
– one is the class of quadratic non-residues modulo N with Jacobi symbol +1,
– the remaining 2 classes contain quadratic non-residues modulo N with Jacobi
symbol -1.
Now let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1, q = 2q1 + 1, and
let N = pq. Let N = pq, and let Z∗N denote the set of integers coprime with N . Note that
the order of Z∗N is φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1) = 4p1q1. For any e such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1,
define the function FN,e : Z∗N → Z∗N such that as FN,e(x) = xe mod N .
Next, we prove two observations that are critical in proving the security of our batch
verification tests for the function FN,e. The following observations follows from [25]
Lemma 1:
Observation 7.1.1. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1,
q = 2q1 + 1, and let N = pq. There are no integers in Z∗N of order 4.
Consider the following 3 facts.
1. When N has this special form, −1 mod N is a quadratic non residue modulo N
with Jacobi symbol (−1|N) = (−1|p) · (−1|q) = (−1) · (−1) = +1.
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2. Note that by Lemma 1 of [31], every quadratic residue mod N has a square root
with Jacobi symbol 1 and a square root with Jacobi symbol -1.
3. Note that if t is a square root of w mod N then −t is also a square root of w
mod N .
By combining these 3 facts, we obtain that
• every quadratic residue mod N has 4 square roots modulo N , which can be written
as t−1, t+1,−t−1 mod N,−t+1 mod N . As seen by a case analysis, each of the
roots is in a different ∼N equivalence class. Notation, t±1 depends what is Jacobi
symbol is (e.g. if Jacobi symbol is −1 mod N then we have t−1)
– For integer 1, its square roots modulo N can be further characterized as
1,−1, t,−t mod N , for some t ∈ Z∗N . Note that
1. 1 is the root in the class of quadratic residues modulo N with Jacobi
symbol 1 (because 12 = 1)
2. −1 is the root in the class of non quadratic residues modulo N with Jacobi
symbol 1 (by above facts.)
3. t and −t are both quadratic non residue modulo N with Jacobi symbol −1
(by above facts) and each of these roots is in a different ∼N equivalence
class.
Now, consider the values x, y ∈ Z∗N and let α = y/xe mod N and α 6= 1.
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Assume α has order 2; that is, α2 = 1 mod N . Recall the above characterization that
square roots of 1 mod N can be written as 1,−1, t,−t mod N . Since α 6= 1 then α is
a quadratic non-residue mod N . Since xy = αxe+1 mod N and e is odd, then xy is
also not a quadratic residue modulo N , which proves the following.
Observation 7.1.2. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1,
q = 2q1 + 1. Also, let N = pq, φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1), x, y ∈ Z∗N , and e ∈ Zφ(N) such
that gcd(e, φ(N))=1. If α = y/xe mod N has order 2 and α 6= 1 then xy mod N is a
quadratic non residue modulo N .
7.2 Batch Verification Tests of Exponentiations Over
RSA Type Groups
GIVEN: batch instance (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) with zi ∈ Z∗N and values t1, . . . , tn are cal-
culated as ti = z
e+1
2
i for each i = 1, . . . , n. Note that t1, . . . , tn are needed for the Small
Exponent Test and are not necessary for the Random Subset Test.
• Random Subset Test(RST):
CHECK: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: wi ∈ ZN and wi = zei
1. Membership Check: For i = 1, . . . , n,
if wi 6∈ ZN then return ⊥ and halt
2. Repeat the following atomic test, independently λ times and accept iff all
subset tests accept:
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ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST
(a) For each i = 1, . . . , n pick bi ∈ {0, 1} at random
(b) Let S = {i : bi = 1}
(c) Compute z =
∏
i∈S zi mod N and w =
∏
i∈S wi mod N
(d) if ze 6= w
return: ⊥ and protocol halts
return: (w1, . . . , wn)
• Small Exponents Test (SET):
CHECK: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: wi = zei
1. Membership Check: For i = 1, . . . , n,
if ti or wi 6∈ ZN then return: ⊥ and halts
if t2i 6= ziwi mod N then return: ⊥ and halts
2. SE:
(a) Pick s1, . . . , sn ∈ {0, 1}λ at random









(c) if ze 6= w
return: ⊥ and protocol halts
return: (w1, . . . , wn)
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Note that above Batch verification Test for Small Exponent Test is an improvement of
the batch verification test described in [21]. In [21] authors check that αzei = wi for some
element α ∈ Z∗N of order ≤ 2, however we show that zei = wi (i.e. α = 1). In addition we
are adding the Random Subset Test, as shown in the last chapter.
Theorem 7.2.1. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 +
1, q = 2q1 + 1, let N = pq, and let λ be a statistical security parameter. Suppose
(z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect batch instance of the batch verification function FN,e.
Then the
1. ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST accepts the batch instance with probability 1/2
2. SMALL EXPONENT TEST accepts the batch instance with probability 2−λ
Proof. ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST: Suppose (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect
batch instance of the batch verification problem. Meaning that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that wi 6= zei . Let αi = wizei mod N . Since S can be malicious it may send wi /∈ Z
∗
N .
Let us look at three cases for αi:
1. if wi /∈ ZN then the verification test returns ⊥ and protocol halts (no need to
calculate αi)
2. if wi ∈ ZN\ Z∗N then wi must be a multiple of p1 or p2, but since zei ∈ Z∗N then
gcd(zei , N) = 1. Thus z
e
i does not have multiple of p1 or p2. This implies that
αi 6= 1.
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3. if wi ∈ Z∗N and by assumption wi 6= zei then αi 6= 1.
without loss of generality assume that i = 1, meaning α1 6= 1 by the above explanation.














i∈M αi = 1. Now
suppose that T ⊆ {2, . . . , n}. Then note that
∏
i∈T




So if the test succeeds on M = T then it must fail on M = T ∪ {1}. This means that the
test must fail on at least half the tests M .
SMALL EXPONENT TEST: Suppose (z1, w1), . . . , (zn, wn) is an incorrect batch instance
of the batch verification problem. Meaning that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
wi 6= zei . For all i = 1, . . . , n, define αi = wi/(zi)e mod N . We obtain that εs = 2−λ as a
consequence of these 5 claims:
1. for all i = 1, . . . , n, if wi 6∈ ZN then the Membership Test outputs ⊥
2. for all i = 1, . . . , n, if wi ∈ ZN \ Z∗N then N can be efficiently factored
3. if w1, . . . , wn ∈ Z∗N , and for at least one value j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, αj has order > 4, the
SE Test does not halt with probability at most 2−λ because of the condition ‘ze 6= w
mod N ’
4. if w1, . . . , wn ∈ Z∗N and α1, . . . , αn have order ≤ 4, then either α1 = · · · = αn = 1 or
the Membership Test halts because of the condition ‘t2i = ziwi mod N ’;
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5. if all of checks in the verification test are satisfied, then, except with probability
2−λ, it holds that αi = 1, and thus wi = (zi)
e mod N , for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Claim 1 directly follows by the Membership Test for that wi ∈ ZN .
Claim 2 follows by definition of Z∗N ; specifically, assume for sake of contradiction, that
wi 6∈ ZN\Z∗N ; this implies that gcd(wi, N) > 1. Since wi < N , it holds that gcd(wi, N) > 1
is a factor of N .
Claim 3 follows by the soundness of the small-exponent batch verification test over Z∗N ,
as follows. First, note that the condition ze = w mod N can be rewritten as Πni=1α
si
i = 1
mod N , using the definition of αi and the following two facts:
1. ze = (Πni=1(zi)
si)e = Πni=1((zi)
e)si mod N ,
2. w = Πni=1(wi)
si mod N .
Now, assume without loss of generality that the j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that αj has order > 4
is j = 1. Recall that by Lagrange’s theorem in group theory, the order of any element in
Z∗N is a divisor of φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1) = 4p1q1, for primes p1, q1. Thus, the order of α1




i = 1 mod N is satisfied





i mod N. (7.1)
We observe that for any s2, . . . , sn, since α1 has order at least min(p1, q1), which is much
larger than 2λ, there is at most one s1 ∈ {0, 1}λ such that Equation 7.1 holds. Thus,
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for fixed s2, . . . , sn, the probability that this equation is true is at most 2
−λ, since s1 is
uniformly chosen from {0, 1}λ, when s1 is drawn at random. Hence, the probability that
Equation 7.1 holds is at most 2−λ even when all of s2, . . . , sn are chosen independently
and uniformly from {0, 1}λ, from which the claim follows.
Claim 4 follows by combining Observation 7.1.1 and Observation 7.1.2 from Section 7.1.
First, Observation 7.1.1 proves that when N has the special form we are considering, there
are no integers of order 4 in Z∗N . Second, Observation 7.1.2 proves that if αi has order 2,
then ziwi mod N is not a quadratic residue modN , which makes C halt because the check
(t2i = ziwi mod N) cannot be satisfied. Thus, we obtain that either α1 = · · · = αn = 1
or C halts because of the condition (t2i = ziwi mod N), from which the claim follows.
Claim 5 follows by directly combining claims 1-4.
The next theorem describes the number of operation requires for each test:
Theorem 7.2.2. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1,
q = 2q1 + 1, and let N = pq. Let σ be the computational security parameter associated
with the group Z∗N and let λ be a statistical security parameter. Then the cost of the
computation of function FN,e on n inputs with
1. RANDOM SUBSET TEST is nλ+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
2. SMALL EXPONENT TEST is 2n+ 2tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
Proof. We prove it by showing each test:
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• Random Subset Test: The Atomic Random Subset requires about n + texp(σ)
multiplications in Z∗N by inspection of the Test. However, in order to lower the
error 2−λ the atomic protocol has to be repeated λ times. Thus the test performs
nλ+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗N . Note that to check whether wi 6∈ Z∗N , the test
only needs to check that these numbers are in [1, p − 1] (i.e. wi > 0 and wi < p),
which only requires time linear in σ. Thus, the operation is a lower-order operation
compared to multiplication in Z∗N , and we can ignore it in our calculations.
• Small Exponent Test: The test performs 2n exponentiations to λ-bit exponents,
1 exponentiation to a σ-bit exponent and 2n multiplications. Note that to check
whether ti or wi 6∈ Z∗N , the test only needs to check that these numbers are in
[1, p− 1], which we can ignore in our calculations.
7.3 From Batch Verification to Batch Delegation
In this section, we propose two client-server protocols for secure delegated computation
of batch exponentiations in group Z∗N . Both protocols use both generic constructions
of batch verification tests which were described in the previous section. In the first
protocol, the client does not hide the input from the server, and the client does not have
to precalculate in the offline phase. In the second protocol, the client hides the input
from the server, but then has to do precalculation in the offline phase. In both protocols,
first we describe the formal description of the protocol (C, S) and then prove efficiency,
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correctness, privacy (if it is applicable), and security requirements.
7.3.1 Protocol 1: Batch Delegation with No Input Privacy or
Offline Phase
Protocol 1 satisfies the following:
Theorem 7.3.1. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1, q =
2q1 + 1, and let N = pq. Let σ be the computational security parameter associated with
the group Z∗N , and let λ be a statistical security parameter. There exists (constructively)
a client-server protocol (C, S) for batch delegation of computation of the function FN,e
on n inputs, which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, unless S can factor N , for εs = 2
−λ;
3. (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc)-efficiency, where
• tF is = texp,n(σ)
• tS is = texp,n(σ) for RST and tS is = texp,2n(σ) for SET
• cc = 2n elements in Z∗N RST and cc = 3n elements in Z∗N for SET
• tP = 0 and mc = 2.
• tC depends on which verification test C uses:
– RST: tC is nλ+ texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
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– SET: tC is 2n+ 2tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S and C: 1σ, 1λ , desc(FN,e), x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z∗N , e ∈ Zφ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) =
1.
1. C sends x1, . . . , xn to S
2. For i = 1, . . . , n
S computes yi := x
e




S sends y1, . . . , yn, t1, . . . , tn to C
3. C runs one of the following verification tests for batch instance (x1, y1) . . . , (xn, yn)
and values t1, . . . , tn.
(a) RST (it does not need values (t1, . . . , tn))
(b) SET
if the chosen test from above is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns (y1, . . . , yn)
Properties of protocol (C, S): The efficiency properties are verified by protocol in-
spection
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• Round complexity: the protocol only requires one round, consisting of one message
from C to S followed by one message from S to C.
• Communication complexity: the protocol requires to transfer n elements from C to
S in Z∗N and 2n elements from S to C in Z∗N using SET and n elements from S to
C in Z∗N using RST (because RST does not need to have t1, . . . , tn elements).
• Runtime complexity: S performs n exponentiations to σ-bit exponents in Z∗N in
RST and n exponentiations to σ-bit exponents in Z∗N in SET. C’s performance also
depends what test is used. The cost of the tests were described in Theorem 7.2.2.
The correctness property follows by showing that if C and S follow the protocol, C always
outputs yi = x
e
i for all i = 1, . . . , n. First, we show the Membership Checks performed
by C are always passed. In the Membership Check in Random Subset Test, C checks if
yi ∈ ZN by verifying that the yi are ≥ 0 and < N . This is true because yi is computed
by S as xei mod N , for i = 1, . . . , N and xi ∈ Z∗N . The Membership Check in Small
Exponent Test and Test, C checks if yi, ti ∈ ZN similarly as above explanations and the







= xe+1i = xi(x
ei
i ) = xiyi mod N.
for yi and ti computed by S as yi := x
e
i and ti := x
e+1
2
i mod N . Lastly, yi is the correct
output since yi = x
e
i computed by S for all i = 1, . . . n.
In order to show the security property against a malicious S, we need to compute an upper
CHAPTER 7. MULTIPLE EXPONENTIATIONS: RSA 146
bound εs on the probability that S convinces C to output a yi such that yi 6= FN,e(xi) for
some i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 6.2.1, in the previous section, we showed that for
• ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST satisfies εs = 1/2, i.e (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) is
incorrect batch instance and C does not return ⊥. However for Random Subset
Test C repeats ATOMIC RANDOM SUBSET TEST λ times. Thus εs = 2
−λ.
• Small Exponent Test satisfies εs = 2−λ.
7.3.2 Protocol 2: Batch Delegation with Input Privacy and Of-
fline Phase
Protocol 2 satisfies the following:
Theorem 7.3.2. Let p, q, p1, q1 be large, same-length, primes, such that p = 2p1 + 1, q =
2q1 + 1, and let N = pq. Let σ be the computational security parameter associated with
the group Z∗N , and let λ be a statistical security parameter. There exists (constructively)
a client-server protocol (C, S) for batch delegation of the computation of function FN,e
on n inputs, which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, unless S can factor N , for εs = 2
−λ;
3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. (tF , tS, tP , tC , cc,mc)-efficiency, where
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• tF is = texp,n(σ)
• tS is = texp,n(σ) for RST and tS is = texp,2n(σ) for SET
• cc = 2n elements in Z∗N RST and cc = 3n elements in Z∗N for SET
• tP = 0 and mc = 2.
• tC depends on which verification test C uses:
– RST: tC is n(λ+ 2) + texp,λ(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
– SET: tC is 4n+ 2tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ) multiplications in Z∗N
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(FN,e), e ∈ Zφ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1.
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ , desc(FN,e), x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z∗N , e ∈ Zφ(N)
Offline phase instructions:
1. For i = 1, . . . , n
C randomly chooses ui ∈ Z∗N and sets vi := u−ei
Online phase instructions:
1. For i = 1, . . . , n
C sets zi := (xi ∗ ui) mod N
C sends z1, . . . , zn to S
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2. For i = 1, . . . , n
S computes wi := z
e




S sends w1, . . . , wn, t1, . . . , tn to C
3. C checks correctness of wi for each i = 1, . . . , n for the given t1, . . . , tn and with
batch instance (z1, w1) . . . , (zn, wn) to one of the following two tests:
(a) Random Subset (RS) Test (it does not need (t1, . . . , tn))
(b) Small Exponent (SE) Test
if the chosen test is not satisfied then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
For i = 1, . . . , n
C sets yi := wi · vi mod N
C returns (y1, . . . , yn)
Properties of protocol (C, S) follows from Section 6.3.2 and Section 7.3.1.
7.4 Performance Analysis and Conclusions
In Table 7.1 we listed all parameters for the two protocols described in Section 7.3 for
secure batch delegation of exponentiations to a single (and possibly malicious) server over
discrete log type groups for the function FN,e(xi) = x
e
i , i = 1, . . . , n.
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Table 7.1: Efficiency parameter of Protocol 1 and 2 for the function FN,e(xi) = x
e
i for all
i = 1, . . . , n





SE: 2n+ 2 · tprod,n,exp(λ) + texp(σ)
RS: n(λ+ 2) + texp,λ(σ)









In Table 7.2 and 7.3 show the concrete performance of our protocols 1 and 2 using the
batch verification test Random Subset (RS) and Small Exponent (SE). In Table 7.2, we
set σ = 1024 and λ = 128 (i.e. security probability will be εs = 2
−128), in Table 7.3, we
set σ = 2048 and λ = 128. We count the number of multiplications of the client in the
online phase and compare with the naive batch test. The test is not naively implemented
because we use an improved algorithm as described in Section 7.4.
• In Table 7.2, observe that the RS test is actually worse than naive for n ≤ 487, the
SE test is the best as we expected. The factor of improvement increases with n: at
n = 10 we can do about 1.45 times better than naive (using SE); at n = 487, about
8 times better (using SE); at n = 5000, about 10 times better (using SE)and about
1.5 times better (using RS).
• In Table 7.3, observe that the RS test is actually worse than naive for n ≤ 306, the
SE test is the best as we expected. The factor of improvement increases with n:
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Table 7.2: C’s online multiplication for increasing value n with εs = 2
−128, λ = 128, σ =
1024-bits
n Naive
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
RS SE RS SE
5 1,536 20,068 1,333 21,097 1,343
10 2,048 20,388 1,398 21,422 1,418
50 6,144 22,948 1,860 24,022 1,960
100 11,264 26,148 2,392 27,272 2,592
200 21,504 32,548 3,402 33,772 3,802
487 50,892 50,916 6,142 52,427 7,116
1,000 103,424 83,748 10,798 85,772 12,798
5,000 513,024 339,748 44,436 345,772 54,436
10,000 1,025,024 659,748 84,346 670,772 104,346
at n = 10 we can do about 1.55 times better than naive (using SE); at n = 500,
about 12 times better (using SE); at n = 5000, about 19 times better (using SE)
and about 2.6 times better (using RS).
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Table 7.3: C’s online multiplication for increasing value n with εs = 2
−128, λ = 128, σ =
2048-bits
n Naive
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
RS SE RS SE
5 2,978 39,817 2,440 41,870 2,450
10 3,909 40,137 2,506 42,195 2,526
50 11,357 42,697 2,968 44,795 3,068
100 20,666 45,897 3,500 48,045 3,700
200 39,284 52,297 4,510 54,545 4,910
306 59,019 59,081 5,541 61,435 6,153
500 95,138 71,497 7,370 74,045 8,370
1,000 188,229 103,497 11,906 106,545 13,906
5,000 932,957 359,497 45,543 366,545 55,543
10,000 1,863,866 679,497 85,454 691,545 105,454
Chapter 8
Conclusions
We studied the problem of a client correctly, efficiently, privately and securely to dele-
gating the computation of a single and multiple group exponentiations to a more compu-
tationally powerful server (i.e., a cloud server). This problem was originally left open in
[17]. We consider the following functions during client server delegations:
1. Fixed-base variable-exponent functions, FG,exp,g : Zn → G defined as FG,exp,g(x) =
gx where G is a multiplicative group and the fixed base is g ∈ G. More specifically,
in this modular exponentiation, we concentrated on the discrete log based scheme
for the cyclic group function, FG,exp,g : Zn → G defined as FG,exp,g(x) = gx where
g ∈ Zq.
2. Variable-base fixed-exponent function, FG,exp,k : G→ G defined as FG,exp,k(x) = xk
whereG is a multiplicative group and the fixed exponent is k ∈ Z+. More specifically
in this modular exponentiation, we concentrated on RSA – type group function,
FG,exp,k(x) = x
k mod n where n = p1 ∗ p2 and pi := 2p′i + 1 for p1, p2, p′1, and p′2 are
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large primes and i = 1, 2.
We presented practical and provable solutions to single and multiple exponentiations
delegation problems for groups commonly used in cryptography, based on both the dis-
crete logarithm and RSA hardness assumptions. Our results directly solve various al-
gorithms in cryptosystems of major importance, including RSA encryption and Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocols.
Appendix A
Delegation of Inverses
This section in appendix A shows a client-server protocol for delegated computation
of group inverses, as described in paper [10]. The protocol described below works for
any group (i.e. commutative and non-commutative groups), and any computationally
unrestricted adversary and will be used as a subprotocol in the protocols given in Chapters
3 and 4 for delegated computation of modular exponentiation of the function FG,exp,k.
Notation: Let (G, ∗) be a group, where the group operation is multiplication, denoted
as ∗. The identity element of a group G is 1. For any a ∈ G, let b = a−1 denote the
inverse of a (i.e. the value b is inverse if a ∗ b = 1). And let FG,inv : G → G where
FG,inv(a) = a
−1. The following theorem is about the existence of such a function:
Theorem A.0.1. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S) for dele-
gated computation of function FG,inv which satisfies
1. δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2. εs-security, for εs = 0;
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3. εp-privacy, for εp = 0;
4. efficiency with parameters (tF , tC , tS, cc,mc) where
• tF and tS are = 1 inversion in G;
• tC is = 3 multiplications in G;
• cc = 2 elements in G and mc = 2.
Remark 1. The Theorem A.0.2 satisfies very strong versions of the security and privacy
requirements because the server S can be the adversary and may run the protocol as much
as desired (i.e. not restricted to polynomially many times), and for efficiency requirements
tC requires a running time of 3 multiplications in G.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). Informally, the description of the protocol
using Theorem A.0.2 for FG,inv shows that on input x ∈ G, C uses the group operation
to mask x with the random element of G then sends the masked element to S . S then
inverts the masked element and sends it back to C. Lastly, C checks the output by using
the group operation on the received value and the masked value and derives the inverse
for the input x. The following is the formal description:
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Input to S: 1σ , desc(FG,inv)
Input to C: 1σ, desc(FG,inv), x ∈ G
Protocol instructions:
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1. C randomly chooses c ∈ G, computes d = x ∗ c and sends d to S;
2. S computes e = d−1 and sends e to C;
3. C checks whether d ∗ e = 1;
if no, C returns failure symbol ⊥;
if yes, C computes y = c ∗ e and returns y.




Checks: d ∗ e = 1 e=d
−1
←−−−−−
If d ∗ e 6= 1, C returns ⊥
If d ∗ e = 1 C computes y = c ∗ e
and returns y
Now we will proof the Theorem A.0.2:
Proof of Theorem A.0.2:
Properties of protocol (C, S):
1. The efficiency properties: C performs at most 3 multiplications in G (tC = 3mult)
and S performs the inversion operation once (tS = 1inv). With respect to round
complexity, the protocol only requires one message from C to S, followed by one
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message from S to C (mc = 2). With respect to communication complexity, the
protocol only requires 2 the communication of elements in total (cc = 1).
2. The correctness properties : If C and S follow the protocol, C’s check d ∗ e = 1 is
satisfied and C’s output y satisfies
y = c ∗ e = c ∗ d−1 = c ∗ (x ∗ c)−1 = c ∗ c−1 ∗ x−1 = x−1.
3. The privacy property follows by combining the following two observations:
(a) on a single execution of (C, S), the message d sent by C does not leak any
information about x;
(b) seeing multiple executions of (C, S) does not help the adversary. C’s input x
is chosen by adversary.
Both observations are consequences of the fact that in each execution of (C, S), the
value d is uniformly distributed inG and is independent from all previous executions.
4. The security property follows by combining the following two observations:
(a) on a single execution (C, S), C’s verification in step 3 forces the adversary to
send an honestly computed value, e, in step 2;
(b) seeing multiple executions of (C, S) does not help the adversary, even C’s
inputs in these execution are chosen by adversary.
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Observation (a) follows from the fact that there exists a single value e such that
e ∗ d = 1. Equivalently, e = d−1 where e is the value that the honest S sends.




In this appendix, we would like to use the textbook along with paper [6] to describe
exponentiation algorithms without delegation.
B.1 Naive Way of Calculating Modular Exponentia-
tion
Let G be a group and let a ∈ G. Define the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G as FG,exp,g(n) = gn.
The naive way of exponentiation is performingn − 1 multiplications (i.e. g ∗ g ∗ ... ∗ g).
Algorithm 4 describes naive exponentiation:
Algorithm 4 Group Exponentiation NExpF
1: y0 = 1
2: for i = 1, . . . , n do
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With this algorithm, n − 1 group multiplications are required in order to evaluate
y = gn, but n can be as large as order of the group. Usually we look at groups containing
about 2512 elements. Exponentiation by this method is not feasible. 2512 − 1 number of
group multiplication takes very long time. In other words Algorithm 4 is an exponential
time algorithm.
B.2 Square-and-Multiply Method for Modular Ex-
ponentiation
In this section we introduce the square and multiply method, which is much better than
the method given in the previous section. First, we write an example then we write the
algorithm.
Example: Suppose the binary length of n is 5 (i.e. |n| = 5), meaning the binary
representation of n has the form b4, b3, b2, b1, b0 where bi ∈ {0, 1}. Then





=16b4 + 8b3 + 4b2 + 2b1 + b0
The square and multiply algorithm will proceed to compute the values y5, y4, y3, y2, y1, y0




5 · gb4 = gb4
y3 = y
2
4 · gb3 = g2b4+b3
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y2 = y
2
3 · gb2 = g4b4+2b3+b2
y1 = y
2
2 · gb1 = g8b4+4b3+2b2+b1
y0 = y
2
1 · gb0 = g16b4+8b3+4b2+2b1+b0
Two group multiplications are required to compute yi from yi+1 and the number of steps
is the binary length of n (i.e. log2 n)
In general, if |n| = σ then the binary representation of n is bσ−1, bσ−2, . . . , b0 such that
n = 2σ−1bσ−1 + 2
σ−2bσ−2 + . . . + 2
0b0. The square and multiply algorithm, Algorithm 5,
proceeds as the example to evaluate the function FG,exp,g : Zq → G as FG,exp,g(n) = gn.
Algorithm 5 Square Multiply Algorithm SMExpF
1: Let bσ−1, bσ−2, . . . , b0 be the binary representation of n
2: yσ = 1
3: for i = σ − 1 down to 0 do





Algorithm 5 uses two group multiplications per iteration of the loop:
1. multiply y by itself (i.e. y2i+1)
2. multiply the result by gbi
Note that computation of gbi is without cost because bi ∈ {0, 1}. The total cost is
2σ = 2 log2(n) = |n| group multiplications.
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In the average case we can do only alittle better than Algorithm 5 in average case.
Since bi = 0 or bi = 1 then g
bi = 1 or gbi = g. Thus if bi = 0 in the square and multiply
algorithm we do not need to multiply by g. Specificly, consider Algorithm 6:
Algorithm 6 Better Square Multiply Algorithm BSMExpF
1: Let bσ−1, bσ−2, . . . , b0 be the binary representation of n
2: yσ = 1
3: for i = σ − 1 down to 0 do
4: if bi = 1 then










The Algorithm 6 runs in the average case 1.5σ. This is because in average, if bi = 1,
the number of group multiplications is σ/2, and we always square the yi, meaning that
the total number of group multiplications is σ. But, in the worst case, Algorithm 6 runs
2σ group multiplications, which is the same as Algorithm 5. This happens when bi = 1
for all i ∈ {0, 1 . . . , σ − 1}. In Chapters 3 and 4, we write the protocol for two parties,
client and server, which improves on Algorithm 6 by delegating to two parties, in order
to decrease the number of client multiplications as well as all other performance metrics.
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